Algor
Well-known member
This is the best review of Nagle's book I have read, from a philosopher of science I admire:
Edward Feser: Aristotle, call your office
- Thread starter The Pixie
- Start date
I think Feser’s main point is that whatever “emerges” from the strata of matter was possibly always an intrinsic potentiality of the strata. This concept mimics a very theist ideal that purpose and meaning are built in, not merely asserted by the actors in the strata.
I agree with that. Theists however claim a supernatural, willful and sentient entity is the origin of the intrinsic immaterial emergent stuff. I don’t see a need for a concept of an external willful supernatural entity to get to emergence. I very un-profoundly state “It is what it is”.
Last edited:
"Intrinsic potentiality" in the sense that it was always possible, like rolling a six is intrinsically a potential when you roll a die? Or like an oak tree from an acorn? I will agree with the former. I would need to see good evidence to support the latter.
It is the former. Once a six is rolled though, you have to deal with what the existence of a six means to us. If a four is rolled.... well, you get the picture. But like our underpinning strata, the dice are the dice.
“....Aristotelian.... theme of the possibility of reviving the teleological notion of an “order that governs the natural world from within”
Last edited:
Algor
Well-known member
I think if you have an oak tree, and you are a physicalist, the existence of the oak tree means that the potential of being an oak tree is, by definition, intrinsic in the physical world, because nothing else was involved in the production of the oak tree. This does not imply that either the individual oak tree, nor oak trees in general are inevitable, only possible.
I think Feser means it in the other sense. His “order that governs the natural world from within” sounds to me like there is something directing to a specific end, like the genetic code in an acorn is governing its growth to become an acorn. I have no problem with that for an acorn where we can see the DNA. I do have a problem with it if he is saying there was something in the first life, or even the Big Bang, that was governing the natural world from within.
I think he backed away from going that far with the following:
"Value, which Nagel insists is a real feature of the world rather than a projection of our subjective desires or sentiments, is, he says, a byproduct of teleology “even if teleology is separated from intention, and the result is not the goal of an agent who aims at it””again, a standard Aristotelian thesis."
I interpret separation from intention as ruling out directing to a specific end. Again, this is where I feel the theist takes it all too far. They think the teleology of God willfully intended what we are experiencing and blame our will for all its flaws.
Last edited:
Algor
Well-known member
It would be very useful to have a discussion on the nature of teleology.
Yes. Philosophical teleology seems to scope down theological teleology in that philosophical teleology isn’t concerned with cause, but whether a phenomenon has some purpose alone. Theological teleology includes design and purpose, and of course, to the theist, a design is felt to have a designer so an ultimate cause is implied.
Design in this context does not imply a designer to the atheist. It only implies intellectually discernible order.
Is a mind nonmaterial?
Feser writes (idiosyncratic punctuation replaced with standard punctuation) that, to the philosophical materialist...
So, from the materialist perspective, when we see the grass as green, that is because grass is composed of certain molecules which reflect light waves in a certain way. Those molecules in turn are composed of certain atoms, which in turn are composed of certain sub-atomic particles, none of which can themselves be called "green." This is supposed to reflect (no pun intended) a weakness in materialism, because materialism allegedly implies that "seeing grass as green" is not seeing reality, since "ultimate" "reality" in "the natural world" does not contain this "greenness."
Assume for the sake of argument that this account of philosophical materialism is right. So, from the non-materialist perspective, when we see grass as green, that is because . . . ?
So, from the materialist perspective, when we see the grass as green, that is because grass is composed of certain molecules which reflect light waves in a certain way. Those molecules in turn are composed of certain atoms, which in turn are composed of certain sub-atomic particles, none of which can themselves be called "green." This is supposed to reflect (no pun intended) a weakness in materialism, because materialism allegedly implies that "seeing grass as green" is not seeing reality, since "ultimate" "reality" in "the natural world" does not contain this "greenness."
Assume for the sake of argument that this account of philosophical materialism is right. So, from the non-materialist perspective, when we see grass as green, that is because . . . ?
we have a non- material rational mind that recognizes some non- material things as existing in reality even if only as intangible concepts. It also points to the existence of a non-material reality, the spiritual reality of God, angels, human spirits/souls.
Last edited:
He can't be talking about materialism there, though. The full passage is:
"The founders of modern philosophy and science overthrew Aristotelianism, and common sense along with it. On the new view of nature inaugurated by Galileo and Descartes, the material world is comprised of nothing more than colorless, odorless, soundless, meaningless, purposeless particles in motion, describable in purely mathematical terms. The differences between dirt, water, rocks, trees, dogs, cats, and human bodies are on this view superficial."
Descartes, of course, was not a materialist. Feser is talking about two different views of the nature of matter - the modern view and the scholastic view. The modern view holds that matter only has primary qualities, and that secondary qualities are added by consciousness. I think the scholastic position was that colors and such are "substantial forms" that are communicated from the object to the mind. (I'm unclear on that offhand.)
I thought he was arguing that "natural philosophy" took a wrong turn with Descartes, and continued going farther wrong, in ways which Descartes himself would not have accepted. (Basically, that as a dualist, Descartes argued that in itself matter itself is colorless, purposeless, etc.; and later thinkers, especially extreme philosophical materialists, added, "correct; and matter is all that exists.")
I don't know. The position that ultimate reality is only what exists in the natural world, and that this reality must be understood in quantitative terms -- the position Feser is apparently criticizing here -- seems to me characteristic of (some forms of) philosophic materialism/naturalism/physicalism in particular, not modern, anti-scholastic thought more generally.
Is the greenness of grass, then, a non-material reality which is communicated directly to our minds? If that is the case, how is it that we sometimes see grass as some color other than green, if for example the lighting is "right"?
It looks like you're right about that. Whoops!
docphin5
Well-known member
The religious conscience is not projecting what you have already conceded to be “real things too”. Set aside orthodoxy who do project God raining fire, reassembling his human corpse, etc. we are talking about the moral consciousness alone, the consciousness of Good, Truth, Love, Justice, you know, “real things too” found in the bonds that hold living souls together. To these people who value these things and PERCEIVE their absolute reality then, yes, it is as you say, these people are able to ascend into the very throne room of God. I concede it is an abstract meta-physical event in the life of a religious conscience, nevertheless, these are “real things too”.
I am not necessarily disagreeing with you, but where you pull up on the road to theism just after conceding something real about the emergent world we perceive, ie., good, love, justice, etc., others embrace the path to its final destination, the presence of God, who is the absolute reality. You call it a projection where others perceive it as an absolute reality beyond the material world, time, and space. You fear it whereas others embrace it.
We may all be progressing to varying degrees but presumably, some people, even if a few people, have progressed further than most, for example, the Socrates, the Platos, the Buddhas, the Senecas, etc. And my favorite, Paul of Tarsus, who you absolutely reject, I know.
But if the fish does not train his muscles to swim fast then he will never catch the food he seeks or escape the enemy chasing him. People who consider the moral world, what is right, and practice the moral world,—the emergent properties “that are real things too”, are strengthening their moral muscles, if you will allow me, and can swim faster than they would if never considering, contemplating, meditating, praying about such things.
Finally, brothers, whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is commendable, if there is any excellence, if there is anything worthy of praise, think about these things. What you have learned and received and heard and seen in me—practice these things, and the God of peace will be with you. (Phil 4:8)
docphin5
Well-known member
A non-materialist perspective might be a teleological one. When we see grass as green that is because the cause of causes needed it to convert sunlight to cellulose so that other animals could convert cellulose to protein so that a moral being might have food to feed his family so that they could know the absolute Good One.
docphin5
Well-known member
…and BOOM! There it is.
”A complete account of consciousness must show that consciousness was “something to be expected.” Nagel thinks that evolutionary theory as we now have it fails in this regard, so it needs to be supplemented.”
I was prompted to read the review after the comment by @docphin5.
From that review:
In Mind and Cosmos, Nagel holds that materialism can’t deliver the goods. Drawing on his bolder and more recent paper “The Psychophysical Nexus,” he now says that materialistic reductionism is false, not that we currently don’t understand how it could be true. For Nagel, perception and other psychological processes involve irreducibly subjective facts; important aspects of the mind are, therefore, forever beyond the reach of physical explanation.
Nagel seems to be defining the problem into science. Reductionism is a useful tool in many situations, but it is - or should not be - not an overriding philosophy. Emergence is a well-established phenomenon is science, and is in direct contradiction to reductionism. so sure, "materialistic reductionism is false" but who believes it anyway?
Nagel thinks that adequate explanations of the origins of life, intelligence, and consciousness must show that those events had a “significant likelihood” of occurring: these origins must be shown to be “unsurprising if not inevitable.” A complete account of consciousness must show that consciousness was “something to be expected.” Nagel thinks that evolutionary theory as we now have it fails in this regard, so it needs to be supplemented.
The review seems to take the view that this is a probability argument. If the universe is big enough, conscious will develop somewhere, no matter how unlikely it is. I think docphin5 understands it differently - that there is something in-built into nature or guiding nature or whatever that was pushing life to develop consciousness. I would guess that that is the correct view of Nagel, given Nagel is arguing evolution is wrong or incomplete - he thinks it is missing that push to consciousness.
That is an interesting idea, but where is the evidence that conscious was “something to be expected”, that there was something pushing life that way?