Eunomius on the Holy Spirit

To say I am having a problem with this editor would be an understatement. This is a quote from the book referenced below.

Screenshot_2020-12-27 Against Eunomius.png

Against Eunomius (page 185)
by St. Basil of Caesarea, Saint Basil of Caesarea,
Mark DelCogliano (Translator), Andrew Radde-Gallwitz (Translator)
ISBN-13: 9780813227184
Publisher: The Catholic University of America Press
Publication date: 10/07/2014
Series: Fathers of the Church Patristic Series
 
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This morning I was reminded of an old disagreement about terminology. During the editing and revision of my thesis. John Feinberg, my first reader, had issues with my use of the term epistemology in regard to Calvin's Doctrine of Illumination of the Holy Spirit in the Institutes. I just came across a recent book which uses the term epistemology in regard to illumination in Basil's work on the Holy Spirit. Amazing to run into this now. Haven't given it much thought since the summer of '77 when I submitted my final draft. John Feinberg was working on his dissertation on the problem of evil for his PhD from U of Chicago. He had a lot of ideas about things that were not particularly easy to understand. I didn't argue with him, just left the disputed wording intact.
 
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rakovsky

Active member
To say I am having a problem with this editor would be an understatement. This is a quote from the book referenced below.

View attachment 479

Against Eunomius (page 185)
by St. Basil of Caesarea, Saint Basil of Caesarea,
Mark DelCogliano (Translator), Andrew Radde-Gallwitz (Translator)
ISBN-13: 9780813227184
Publisher: The Catholic University of America Press
Publication date: 10/07/2014
Series: Fathers of the Church Patristic Series
The simple confusion from the statement arises from the fact that the particular kind of nature that one refers to when referring to the nature that a person has is not necessarily clear. In Normal theological terms, we say that God has a divine nature and that this divine nature is shared by all three persons of the Trinity. All three persons of the Trinity have the divine nature. This is the idea of chalcedon. And So speaking theologically in normal discussions and use of this term nature, we would not say that the Holy Spirit has a third nature.

However, there is kind of an Arcane issue or an obscure issue here in that conceivably in speech every person can be referred to as having his own individual personal nature that is distinguishable from every other person's nature. So in a broad sense on one hand we can say that Stirling and I both share the one human nature of humanity. However the term nature can be used in a different sense also to refer to a particular being's specific nature. And so in this sense Sterling and I have a total of two personal natures between us. So speaking strictly logically the author quoted in the first message above it looks to me is using reasoning and making an observation about each person of the Trinity having their own personal natures. Sure if they each have their own rank as persons in the trinity or they each have their own distinct qualities or attributes within the trinity then they can be said to each have their own personal natures within the trinity even if they are each fully Divine and fully God, which is something that Arianism would deny. As a result, even if we conclude that each person of the trinity has his own personal nature, it still does not follow that arianism is correct or that only one person of the Trinity is God, because they can all have their own personal nature while still sharing the one divine nature that is common to all of them.
 

rakovsky

Active member
The issue of personal Natures versus a shared nature comes up most commonly in the discussions between chalcedonian Christians such as Protestants and Orthodox and Catholics versus Oriental orthodox or non chalcedonian churches like the Coptic and Armenian churches.

The issue there is that chalcedon asserts that God has one nature and that Christ has two natures, using the idea of broad natures so that Christ has both the human nature and the divine nature. The Coptic Christians in debates on this topic will often deny that Christ has two Natures arguing that he can only have one nature because he is one being. What those particular Coptic apologists are referring to is the idea of a personal nature. When chalcedon teaches that Christ has two Natures it is referring to the broad shared category of the human and divine natures. When those Coptic apologists deny that he has two Natures, they on the other hand seem to often explain this in terms of him having only one personal nature and not being two persons. So the difference in those debates that is unfortunately typically not made clear is that the debates involve the broad sense of the term nature vs the personal sense of the word nature.

None the less the Coptic position is not coherent on this matter because unlike the message in the opening post, Coptic Christians do not actually refer to God as having three natures or saying that Christ has a second nature and the Holy Spirit has a third in nature and the father has a first nature or something like that. In other words the Coptic apologists do not consistently use the term nature as if it is only referring to a personal nature.

Unfortunately I have talked to different non chalcedonian Christians on this topic and even though some of them find the chalcedonian idea of teenagers to be correct, I think that it would be pretty hard in Practical terms to get the entire Coptic Church to formally accept chalcedon because the rejection of chalcedon is so much a defining feature of their Church. It would be like trying to get Roman Catholics to give up the Supreme rank of the papacy or to get most Protestant churches to openly give up Luther's five Solas because those are such defining features of their denominations. Coptic leaders have over the years made formal declarations accepting chalcedonian theological points but it hasn't amounted to their Church actually formally accepting chalcedon.
 
That is helpful. The whole discussion is difficult. I have a better grasp on it having read your post. i remember the first time the professor mentioned but did not explain Homoousia and later the Monophysite controversy. Walked out after class wondering what that discussion had been about. Really, this was unexplored territory. The whole idea of Being was mysterious. Reading Greek helps you sort it out because you divorce the ideas from English words. People walked around with paperback copies of J. P. Sartre Being & Nothingness. But nobody seemed to know what it was trying to say. Even the other so called existentialists didn't like the book. It was a question you didn't dare ask. What does this mean? Fortuantly you didn't have to answer that question. It wasn't on the exam. Of course Sartre isn't talking about early church doctrine. But as I read them and run across this language in an ancient text I always think of Being & Nothingness it is a reflex reaction to the terminology. It's all there, clearly expressed in greek, Sartre didn't invent the terminology.
 
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BJ Bear

Active member
The simple confusion from the statement arises from the fact that the particular kind of nature that one refers to when referring to the nature that a person has is not necessarily clear. In Normal theological terms, we say that God has a divine nature and that this divine nature is shared by all three persons of the Trinity. All three persons of the Trinity have the divine nature. This is the idea of chalcedon. And So speaking theologically in normal discussions and use of this term nature, we would not say that the Holy Spirit has a third nature.

However, there is kind of an Arcane issue or an obscure issue here in that conceivably in speech every person can be referred to as having his own individual personal nature that is distinguishable from every other person's nature. So in a broad sense on one hand we can say that Stirling and I both share the one human nature of humanity. However the term nature can be used in a different sense also to refer to a particular being's specific nature. And so in this sense Sterling and I have a total of two personal natures between us. So speaking strictly logically the author quoted in the first message above it looks to me is using reasoning and making an observation about each person of the Trinity having their own personal natures. Sure if they each have their own rank as persons in the trinity or they each have their own distinct qualities or attributes within the trinity then they can be said to each have their own personal natures within the trinity even if they are each fully Divine and fully God, which is something that Arianism would deny. As a result, even if we conclude that each person of the trinity has his own personal nature, it still does not follow that arianism is correct or that only one person of the Trinity is God, because they can all have their own personal nature while still sharing the one divine nature that is common to all of them.
When people speak of humans sharing a nature they are speaking in the abstract. When Christians speak of the one nature of God they are speaking in the concrete.
 

rakovsky

Active member
When people speak of humans sharing a nature they are speaking in the abstract. When Christians speak of the one nature of God they are speaking in the concrete.
What you wrote needs alot more explanation about what you mean by an abstract nature vs. a concrete nature, because it's too ambiguous.

There are many humans on the earth, and they all share a "human nature". Maybe by that you mean an abstract nature, because I am not referring to any specific, concrete persons, but rather persons in general.

There is one "God" and He has a "divine nature". Maybe you think that in this context I am using the term in a concrete way, because God is a concrete (ie specific) being.

However, the examples I gave do not really show that there is a substantive difference in terms of concrete vs abstract when talking about the human nature vs the divine nature. This is because even if I am specifically/concretely talking about all specific, concrete persons, I can still say that they have the human nature, whether you are talking about concrete vs abstract. The same goes for God. It's true that in Monotheism, there is only one God, but nonetheless, we can talk about the nature of man just as we can talk about the nature of God.

There is also the personal nature of a concrete, individual person and the personal or individual nature of God. But whereas a human is one person, God is three concrete/specific persons. So just as we say that humans, angels, plants, and animals have a human, angelic, plant, and animalian nature, it also makes sense to say that God has a divine nature. Since God incarnated and became man such that he is both man and God, it makes sense that He has two natures, the human nature and the divine nature.

In general, the topic about God's natures/nature in the Chalcedonian / anti-Chalcedonian context is very semantic, abstract, and philosophical. I can show that the Chalcedonian position is consistent logically, but someone who argues against my point cannot be forced in terms of online arguing/debating to admit this, maybe even mentally to themselves.

For example, many Copts will agree that "humanity" is the human nature, and that "divinity" is the divine nature, and that God is both human and divine, and that God has divinity and that God has humanity. But many of them oppose the logical conclusion that in a sense God has two natures.
 

rakovsky

Active member
When people speak of humans sharing a nature they are speaking in the abstract. When Christians speak of the one nature of God they are speaking in the concrete.
A "Nature" is a category or a collection of properties or qualities. That is how the term nature is practically used. The qualities of a being or beings can be categorized different ways, so the term nature can be used in different ways. We can talk about color properties like the "red nature" of an object, heat properties, like a "hot nature", etc.

Humans have a human nature, humanity, whereas God has a divine nature, divinity.

There is no difference in terms of abstract vs concrete "natures" in that underlined statement. Although it's true that there are billions of humans, all who share in the one human nature, it's also true that each concrete human shares in the human nature that belongs to all humans. By comparison, there is one God, and so there is only one God who possesses the Godly/Divine nature, and it's also true that the one concrete real God possesses the one divine nature who, in our faith, belongs to God alone.

In other words, there are millions of concrete humans who have the human nature in the abstract/collective category. The concrete/individual nature that each of them possess is a human nature. The same kind of thing could be said about God before the incarnation. Christ's concrete nature" on the other hand has two natures in the abstract/collective category, ie the collective/abstract nature of God and the collective nature of man.

I feel I didn't do a clear enough job explaining what I meant today. But this kind of semantic conversation/debate can go on for centuries anyway depending on how dedicated its adherents are to one side of the debate, which in the Chalcedonian/anti-Chalcedonian conflict has gone on for 1550+ years already.
 
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BJ Bear

Active member
What you wrote needs alot more explanation about what you mean by an abstract nature vs. a concrete nature, because it's too ambiguous.

There are many humans on the earth, and they all share a "human nature". Maybe by that you mean an abstract nature, because I am not referring to any specific, concrete persons, but rather persons in general.

There is one "God" and He has a "divine nature". Maybe you think that in this context I am using the term in a concrete way, because God is a concrete (ie specific) being.

However, the examples I gave do not really show that there is a substantive difference in terms of concrete vs abstract when talking about the human nature vs the divine nature. This is because even if I am specifically/concretely talking about all specific, concrete persons, I can still say that they have the human nature, whether you are talking about concrete vs abstract. The same goes for God. It's true that in Monotheism, there is only one God, but nonetheless, we can talk about the nature of man just as we can talk about the nature of God.

There is also the personal nature of a concrete, individual person and the personal or individual nature of God. But whereas a human is one person, God is three concrete/specific persons. So just as we say that humans, angels, plants, and animals have a human, angelic, plant, and animalian nature, it also makes sense to say that God has a divine nature. Since God incarnated and became man such that he is both man and God, it makes sense that He has two natures, the human nature and the divine nature.

In general, the topic about God's natures/nature in the Chalcedonian / anti-Chalcedonian context is very semantic, abstract, and philosophical. I can show that the Chalcedonian position is consistent logically, but someone who argues against my point cannot be forced in terms of online arguing/debating to admit this, maybe even mentally to themselves.

For example, many Copts will agree that "humanity" is the human nature, and that "divinity" is the divine nature, and that God is both human and divine, and that God has divinity and that God has humanity. But many of them oppose the logical conclusion that in a sense God has two natures.
What i meant to indicate is that people can speak concretely or abstractly about human nature. To speak conccetely of that is to speak of the nature of each person as each hypostase subsists in itself.

To speak abstractly of human nature is to speak of a category that doesn't exist in reality as each human hypostase subsists in itself rather than collectively.

When we speak of the revelation of the economic Trinity we speak concretely because the the three hypostases subsist in the one nature.

Btw, we might be thinking the same thing but expressing it differently with regard to the dividing line on the two natures. I could be wrong, but the way I remember it is that the dividing line was the late change at the council of the preposition from of to in, that is, from one person of two natures to two natures in one person.
 
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rakovsky

Active member
1. What i meant to indicate is that people can speak concretely or abstractly about human nature. To speak conccetely of that is to speak of the nature of each person as each hypostase subsists in itself.

2. To speak abstractly of human nature is to speak of a category that doesn't exist in reality as each human hypostase subsists in itself rather than collectively.

3. When we speak of the revelation of the economic Trinity we speak concretely because the the three hypostases subsist in the one nature.
1. Your phrase " as each hypostase subsists in itself" is unclear, maybe partly because there is no clear universal definition of "hypostasis". I have seen a Copt refer to it as "underlying foundation", which is an etymological meaning and therefore not "wrong", but still not clear enough. On one hand the term literally and Biblically means "substance". But on the other hand, a few centuries later it started to mean practically something analogous to "person" or "fundamental individuality"

2. It seems arguable whether a collective category "doesn't exist in reality." Whether it exists in reality depends on whether the people who make up that category exist in reality, which is the same as a concrete nature. Human nature collectively exists, but a specific/concrete flying unicorn's nature does not exist in reality. So it's better IMO to use the terms collective vs individual/specific instead of "abstract vs concrete."

3. You say "When we speak of the revelation of the economic Trinity we speak concretely (ie. speak of the nature of each person as each hypostase subsists in itself) because the the three hypostases subsist in the one nature."

Again, this is confusing or unclear. When you say that the three hypostases subsist in the one nature, it raises the question of whether you mean that they are in a concrete nature or an abstract nature. Consider what the expression means that a hypostasis exists "in a nature". A hypostasis exists "in" a concrete person, and in a collective category (ie. what you are calling an abstract nature.) Christ exists both "in" the collective category of humans and the broad/general/"collective" category of God, even though God is the only being who exists in the collective category of God. This is because Christ belongs to those two broad categories, just as a specific plant's category belongs to the general category of plants.

So, to put it simply, a human is in the collective category of humans, God is in the broad/"collective" category of God, and Christ, being both a human and God belongs to both broad categories. When Chalcedonians (eg. EOs and Lutherans) say that Christ is in two natures, this is what they mean.

Your point #3's source of confusion is that whereas there are many humans, the Abrahamic faiths accept only one God. Nonetheless, this does not mean that when we refer to the human and divine natures that we are referring to natures inconsistently. It makes sense that we are referring to them consistently in general categories when we say thinks like "There is the nature of Man (not just the nature a particular man) and the nature of God."

Grammatically there is potential for confusion, because the two sentences, whether made consistently (broad v broad) or inconsistently (broad v specific) sound the same in the part referring to God, ie. "The nature of Man and the nature of God [broadly]" vs. "The nature of a Man and the nature of [the One] God." As a result, certainly Christians speak of God's "Divine Nature" ("Divinity") and God's own Nature in both the collective and specific/concrete senses.

I thought about a writing a concise article giving the proofs of the Chalcedonian viewpoint and sharing them with "Oriental Orthodox" who reject Chalcedon. There are tons of pages and pages of semantic arguments like what we are having that have comprised polemics between the Chalcedonian and Oriental churches over the centuries.

God is in the divine nature both concretely and in the abstract. Christ's one concrete or "personal" nature is in two "collective" natures.


Btw, we might be thinking the same thing but expressing it differently with regard to the dividing line on the two natures. I could be wrong, but the way I remember it is that the dividing line was the late change at the council of the preposition from of to in, that is, from one person of two natures to two natures in one person.
The debates of the Chalcedonian split began before Chalcedon because the Coptic patriarch Dioscorus labeled the teaching of Rome, Antioch, and Constantinople that Christ had two natures heretical, and he was making his arguments in the decades before Chalcedon.. Dioscorus himself did not get into deep long explanations of why he thought that. It was more an assertion that it was a wrong teaching.

The basic Coptic argument has been along the lines that every person has his own one nature (what you are calling his concrete nature), so that Christ can only be in "one nature", and that if Christ is in two natures, then it implies (according to their claim) that Christ is in two hypostases, and hence in two persons. In other words, the underlying premise of the Coptic argument is that there can be only one nature per person inherently.

The Coptic argument does not work though because when both we and the Copts say that God has three hypostases and three persons, yet neither we nor the Copts say that God has "three natures."

Since we do not say that God has three natures despite him being three persons and three hypostases, then when we talk about God's nature, we are not talking about nature in the sense that only 1 person can have 1 nature, ie we are not talking about natures in the personal sense of natures, but in the collective broad sense of "nature".
 

BJ Bear

Active member
1. Your phrase " as each hypostase subsists in itself" is unclear, maybe partly because there is no clear universal definition of "hypostasis". I have seen a Copt refer to it as "underlying foundation", which is an etymological meaning and therefore not "wrong", but still not clear enough. On one hand the term literally and Biblically means "substance". But on the other hand, a few centuries later it started to mean practically something analogous to "person" or "fundamental individuality"

2. It seems arguable whether a collective category "doesn't exist in reality." Whether it exists in reality depends on whether the people who make up that category exist in reality, which is the same as a concrete nature. Human nature collectively exists, but a specific/concrete flying unicorn's nature does not exist in reality. So it's better IMO to use the terms collective vs individual/specific instead of "abstract vs concrete."

3. You say "When we speak of the revelation of the economic Trinity we speak concretely (ie. speak of the nature of each person as each hypostase subsists in itself) because the the three hypostases subsist in the one nature."

Again, this is confusing or unclear. When you say that the three hypostases subsist in the one nature, it raises the question of whether you mean that they are in a concrete nature or an abstract nature. Consider what the expression means that a hypostasis exists "in a nature". A hypostasis exists "in" a concrete person, and in a collective category (ie. what you are calling an abstract nature.) Christ exists both "in" the collective category of humans and the broad/general/"collective" category of God, even though God is the only being who exists in the collective category of God. This is because Christ belongs to those two broad categories, just as a specific plant's category belongs to the general category of plants.

So, to put it simply, a human is in the collective category of humans, God is in the broad/"collective" category of God, and Christ, being both a human and God belongs to both broad categories. When Chalcedonians (eg. EOs and Lutherans) say that Christ is in two natures, this is what they mean.

Your point #3's source of confusion is that whereas there are many humans, the Abrahamic faiths accept only one God. Nonetheless, this does not mean that when we refer to the human and divine natures that we are referring to natures inconsistently. It makes sense that we are referring to them consistently in general categories when we say thinks like "There is the nature of Man (not just the nature a particular man) and the nature of God."

Grammatically there is potential for confusion, because the two sentences, whether made consistently (broad v broad) or inconsistently (broad v specific) sound the same in the part referring to God, ie. "The nature of Man and the nature of God [broadly]" vs. "The nature of a Man and the nature of [the One] God." As a result, certainly Christians speak of God's "Divine Nature" ("Divinity") and God's own Nature in both the collective and specific/concrete senses.

I thought about a writing a concise article giving the proofs of the Chalcedonian viewpoint and sharing them with "Oriental Orthodox" who reject Chalcedon. There are tons of pages and pages of semantic arguments like what we are having that have comprised polemics between the Chalcedonian and Oriental churches over the centuries.

God is in the divine nature both concretely and in the abstract. Christ's one concrete or "personal" nature is in two "collective" natures.



The debates of the Chalcedonian split began before Chalcedon because the Coptic patriarch Dioscorus labeled the teaching of Rome, Antioch, and Constantinople that Christ had two natures heretical, and he was making his arguments in the decades before Chalcedon.. Dioscorus himself did not get into deep long explanations of why he thought that. It was more an assertion that it was a wrong teaching.

The basic Coptic argument has been along the lines that every person has his own one nature (what you are calling his concrete nature), so that Christ can only be in "one nature", and that if Christ is in two natures, then it implies (according to their claim) that Christ is in two hypostases, and hence in two persons. In other words, the underlying premise of the Coptic argument is that there can be only one nature per person inherently.

The Coptic argument does not work though because when both we and the Copts say that God has three hypostases and three persons, yet neither we nor the Copts say that God has "three natures."

Since we do not say that God has three natures despite him being three persons and three hypostases, then when we talk about God's nature, we are not talking about nature in the sense that only 1 person can have 1 nature, ie we are not talking about natures in the personal sense of natures, but in the collective broad sense of "nature".
Well, assuming we had a common vocabulary and framework I took some short cuts.They were along scholastic lines. If that type of speech is verboten in your circles that is ok as we are both trinitarians.

What I am curious about is what do you perceive to be the substantive point of dispute with the Copts regarding Christology. i saw what you posted but i wonder how you square that with the councils.

Cyril and his Christology loomed large over three councils. At Chalcedon the Acts show that the attendees thought they were affirming the faith of Cyril (among others).

Since Cyril was Coptic and as far as i know neither of the Roman churches (East or West) speak of him as a heretic or in error in this regard what is the actual point of contention? Obviously, the Coptic and other Oriental Orthodox affirm the faith of Cyril in this regard. Thanks.
 

rakovsky

Active member
Well, assuming we had a common vocabulary and framework I took some short cuts.They were along scholastic lines. If that type of speech is verboten in your circles that is ok as we are both trinitarians.

What I am curious about is what do you perceive to be the substantive point of dispute with the Copts regarding Christology. i saw what you posted but i wonder how you square that with the councils.

Cyril and his Christology loomed large over three councils. At Chalcedon the Acts show that the attendees thought they were affirming the faith of Cyril (among others).

Since Cyril was Coptic and as far as i know neither of the Roman churches (East or West) speak of him as a heretic or in error in this regard what is the actual point of contention? Obviously, the Coptic and other Oriental Orthodox affirm the faith of Cyril in this regard. Thanks.
BJ,

First:
The ongoing substantive point of contention in my view is this semantic, abstract, philosophical use of the word "nature", which you and I have already touched on. The Chalcedonian, Dyophysite idea is that Christ is in the nature of Man and in the nature of God, which refers to the basic categorical, broad idea that I have been trying to explain. In James' Epistle, he uses the term "nature" to refer to categories, saying, "For every nature of beasts, and of birds, and of serpents, and of the rest, is tamed, and hath been tamed, by the nature of man". A serpent, for instance, has both the nature of a beast and the nature of a serpent. Something actually can have more than one nature.

The Coptic view's premise on the other hand goes that if something is said to have two natures, then it must have two persons or hypostases. In other words, a person has his own whole nature, and he cannot have two of his own total whole natures.

But this Coptic view fails to grasp that when Chalcedonians say that Christ has two natures, Chalcedonians are not saying that he has two of his whole entire total nature. We are saying that Christ is in both categories.

Copts will say at times that Christ's human nature is His humanity and His divine nature is his Divinity, and that He is human and Divine, and that He has Humanity and has Divinity. They can say that He has both. But even then, the OOs don't have a consensus that this means He "is in two natures."

Second:
The OOs are not purely reiterating Cyril on the point, despite such claims. I and other EOs have pulled apart Cyril's writing on the topic. Cyril said that he was in agreement with the Antiochians, who professed two natures. He defended the Orthodoxy of the Dyophysite John of Antioch against those other Egyptian Christians who denied it. After he died, however, the Egyptian faction who considered the Dyophysites heretics reared their head and became in control of the Egyptian church and they labeled Dyophysitism heretical.

Third,
There is an ecclesiastical problem at the root of the split as to how to deal with such conflicts.

Historically, in the early 5th Century , there was a preacher named Eutyches whose Dyophysite opponents reported that he preached strange ideas like Christ having heavenly flesh before his birth but not having humanity after his birth and deposed him. They deposed him particularly for denying that Christ had two natures, but there were other things against him too.

In response, the Coptic Patriarch called what some OOs considered an "ecumenical council" at Ephesus (Iirc, it was called Ephesus II). At this council, Eutyches announced something along the lines of "I confess that before the Incarnation, Christ had two natures, but after the union, only one." The Catholic Encyclopedia cites his statement as: "I confess that our Lord was of [ek] two natures, before the union; but after the union, I acknowledge one nature." Pope Leo wrote his Tome about how wrong Eutyches' statement was. It does not make sense that Christ had both his natures only before he became man, and yet didn't have both afterwards. But Dioscorus didn't allow the Tome to be read.

Dioscorus' council decided:
1. Eutyches' statement was orthodox.
2. Eutyches was wrongly deposed by the Dyophysite patriarch Flavian.
3. The Dyophysite teaching that Christ has two natures is a heresy.
4. Since Flavian deposed Eutyches and taught two natures, Flavian was deposed and IIRC excommunicated. He died soon after in exile, maybe being killed as was alleged at Chalcedon.

An interesting point is that later on, Eutyches seemingly was saying things too heretical for the OOs, saying that after the union, Christ's divine nature swallowed His human nature, the idea being that He only had His divine nature afterwards. So the OOs, including Dioscorus, said that Eutyches "returned" to wallowing in his own "vomit." The logical implication is that Eutyches actually was a monophysite heretic. But this change of affairs on Eutyches didn't make the OOs revisit Ephesus II or say that the Chalcedonians were right to depose him, which would have been the logical conclusion.

Now here his where the practical dilemma arises for the Chalcedonian side: How to resolve this schism? And how should they have tried to resolve it in the 5th century?

One answer is to try to persuade the Copts that Dyophysitism makes sense and to do nothing ecclesiastically using divisive church decisions. The problem with that method is that the Copts have already called a supposedly "ecumenical" council that banned Dyophysitism. Clearly decades of debates hadn't persuaded them. Even today, the OOs don't have a consensus on whether Dyophysitism is theologically orthodox, although many OOs do.

Another option, which was what was chosen, was to call the ecumenical council of Chalcedon to resolve the problem. Historically the Church had been calling Councils since the book of Acts to resolve debates like these. So the idea of calling a council seems right. Further, since Nicea, the ecumenical councils were called to have authority for the whole church. So Chalcedon reviewed the debate and said that Christ is in two natures, meaning His humanity and divinity.

The OOs rejected Chalcedon because of its teaching of two natures. So one hypothetical option that has been considered for the sake of Church unity has been to suggest possibly that Chalcedon is not a fundamental council of the Christian Church and that Chalcedonians and OOs can reunite without considering Chalcedon ecumenical and authoritative. And there are three problems with this solution for the Chalcedonian side:

1. Eastern Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and probably numerous Protestant Churches do consider Chalcedon an authoritative ecumenical Council, even if they don't consider it infallible. Chalcedon can't be easily waved away at an ecclesiastical level. Maybe Anglicanism or Lutheranism downplays it as a "council of men" sometimes, but the EO church considers the 7 Councils foundational. It considers itself a "Conciliar" Church. And actually the OOs have the same ecclesiology about the authority of Councils as the EOs, but they just consider Chalcedon to be not an authority or else reject it. EO and OO leaders actually have made some good intrachurch statements affirming aspects of each other's orthodoxy, but it still hasn't amounted to the OO Church formally affirming Chalcedon.

2. Church leaders did attempt a kind of reunion in the few centuries after Chalcedon. It led to the Acacian Schism. The biggest practical problem for the EOs was that the OO leader Severus was using the reunion as a reason to persecute those who considered Chalcedon to be still binding. In other words, Church leaders formally united the EO and OO churches without an agreement on whether Chalcedon was orthodox, but the flocks kept polemicising and expressing opposite views on the topic and it led to continuing conflict and even repression.

3. There actually have been a small fraction of OO theologians over the centuries who at times say things along the lines of Christ having only divinity and not humanity. A big majority of OOs would not share their view, but it still creates a problem from the Chalcedonian POV because the OOs don't reject those theologians. That is, if you consider the substance of Chalcedon to be very important for Christology, then it creates a problem of those theologians' orthodoxy. In the EO church, we would say that those theologians are in conflict with orthodoxy due to Chalcedon, but the OO Church as far as I can tell doesn't have a Council that so fundamentally and clearly teaches that Christ retains both his divinity and humanity as Chalcedon. Some OOs I believe have correctly interpreted sources like the Nicene Creed as entailing these beliefs, but the purpose of Chalcedon was to make a succinct, clear statement on the topic. And without it, a problem arises for the Church as to how to express itself on so fundamental an issue if correct, succinct expressions like Chalcedon's are misinterpreted.

So to say that we can reunite as one Church without considering Chalcedon authoritative creates a few big problems for the EO side.
 
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