Not Opposite of Himself

I'm sure you know where I am going with this, "Jesus Christ is both God and Man". The dictionary definition above is not true, especially in monotheistic Christianity. The Trinity teaches that the one God is, was, and always will be one God. There is no ontological identical and opposite of himself or some other god being identical and opposite of himself. The God of the Bible is God alone and in a category of himself. There is no other of his kind and class, God is one. He cannot have any known or unknown ontological directional opposites and absences of himself. And there is no others before and after, above and below, backwards and forward, beside and inbetween, etc. Also the Hypostatic Union teaches that Jesus Christ is both God and man, but "God" and "man" are not directional opposites, they are in two different categories, and cannot be ontologically equivalent. The same applies to angels, the devil is not the opposite of God, as often depicted of good versus evil in context of opposite words. Angles are different categories, regardless if you can draw out opposites based on their attributes, its a categorical difference and not the same sense. God has no opposites of himself. Or any other known and unknown created thing. There is simply no identical and opposites of himself.

For example, Jesus Christ is a man entails that he is not a woman. The opposite of man is a woman from its ontological category or its kind and class of human beings. It would be a category mistake to assume that human properties being found in the category of a potent man, and then place it into the category of omnipotent God. As if God is both potent and omnipotent, ~(P ^ O). Both "God" and "Man" may have similarities and differences, but they will never be each other’s ontological directional opposites, and they will never collide or overlap into each other categories.

The phrase "Jesus Christ is both God and Man" is a claim that within the category "Nature", Jesus Christ is in both ontological categories "God" and "Man". These are not separate categories, but the same category called "Nature". (See definition of Hypostatic Union).

Further, being "Man" necessarily entails that Jesus Christ isn't "Bacteria" but being "Man" does not necessarily entail that he is not a woman. Jesus Christ being "male" within the ontological category "Man" is what necessarily entails that he is not "female" (see Gen 1:26).

The notion that "male" and "female" are considered opposites is because a difference can be found within one of their shared attributes. For example within their attribute of reproduction: males produce small motile gametes and females produce eggs. However, males and females are opposites in a very narrow range of differences when compared to the larger set comparisons (for example: alive versus inanimate, multicell versus single cell, animal versus plant, vertebrate versus invertebrate, mammal versus avian, bipedal versus quadrupedal, morally responsible versus non morally responsible, etc. . .).

The primary reason males and females are considered opposites because there are only two choices presented within the "Man" subset. If there were a 3rd choice available, the idea that males and females are opposites would be a more complex proposition.

Similarly, if "God" and "Man" are the only two choices presented within the category "Nature", then by default they are opposites and their distinctions within the same sense are used to set them apart. For example "immortal" and "mortal" are distinctions between "God" and "Man" within the category "Nature" and are related to the same sense: i.e. "ability to die".

1. Since Jesus Christ is both God and Man, then there exist a incompatibility binary relationship of having opposite properties. Because both God and Man are in different categories and not the same category. The binary relationship in the Hypostatic Union framework are often viewed in antonyms or opposite pair of words, which is a word that has the opposite meaning of another word. But not in the same sense because there are two different natures having their own respective properties and the Person is just a subject of predication. Whatever attribute the subject does according to the Divine Nature means he cannot do the opposite as being God alone (both omnipresent and non-omnipresent). And vice versa, whatever attribute the subject does according to the human nature means he cannot do the opposite as being Man alone (both localized and non-localized). The subject can do both at the same time, but not from the same sense based on their different categorical differences.

2. These two opposite ideas of God's "omnipresent" along with Man's "localized" are being jointed together in a logical conjunction "and" for a unique and contrasting framework. The doctrine define these logical conjunctions to be parallel expression of oppositions, which is a antithesis, from anti 'against' + tithenai "to place" or in other words, "a setting opposite or contrasting of ideas is expressed by parallelism of words that are the opposites of," and those ideas might not always be structurally opposites in the doctrine, for example, "both equal and subordinate" are opposites, and "both omnipotent and ignorant" are not opposites. But both structures are logically valid within the framework, so its not always framed in oppositions to each other. This framework is to compare their indifferences and to emphasize the union.

The analysis asserts (without any support) that all actions taken by the person that are contradictory to one nature are exclusively attributed to the other nature. The question becomes: Are there actions that can be taken by the person that involve both natures but contradicts one of the natures?

For example: The person Jesus died. By definition he was mortal and not immortal. The immortality of one nature and mortality of the other nature are in direct contradiction. The attribute "ability to die" has a "yes" and "no" result in the same sense at the same time. To say that Jesus didn't die on the cross entails enormous theological ramifications.
 
You said you see NO distinction or difference between "God AND Man" and "God AS Man".

So I am trying to see if you understand the difference between the words "AND" and "AS".

Can you give us your final answer to these questions...

1) Is ice... (A) water AND ice (B) water AS ice (C) no difference

2) Was the dove... (A) the Holy Spirit AND a dove (B) the Holy Spirit AS a dove (C) no difference

3) Was the man Christ Jesus... (A) God AND the man Christ Jesus (B) God AS the man Christ Jesus (C) no difference

I answer B to all three questions.
1) refers to a difference in FORM. Water AS ice is still water.
2) A is false. The Holy Spirit AND a dove are two distinct Persons. The Holy Spirit is ONE. B is correct.
3)Question is incorrected stated. Should be " Was Christ Jesus God AND Man"?
 
The phrase "Jesus Christ is both God and Man" is a claim that within the category "Nature", Jesus Christ is in both ontological categories "God" and "Man". These are not separate categories, but the same category called "Nature". (See definition of Hypostatic Union).

Thanks for the thoughtful reply. But Its hard to understand what you are saying here because you are not speaking in the Hypostatic Union/Chalcedonian language. I would assume when you say, "Nature" then you are referring to "subsistence/hypostasis" or in other words, "Son-person". In one sense both Divine and Human Natures are separate categories. But since we are talking about a "union" (Hypostatic Union, then in the other sense both Divine and Human Natures are distinct categories. Or, a joining two natures together in the Son-person. And "God" and "Man" are not properties and attributes of the Natures or of the Person. Rather its what the natures have constituted what the Son-person to be, like: the Divine Nature constitutes the Son-person to be God and the Human Nature consitutes the selfsame Son-person to be Man. So Jesus Christ is both God and Man, the Person who continued remaining what he was fully God, while also simultaneously became what he previously has not been before fully Man. And he continues to be both God and Man at the same time forever.

Similarly, if "God" and "Man" are the only two choices presented within the category "Nature", then by default they are opposites and their distinctions within the same sense are used to set them apart. For example "immortal" and "mortal" are distinctions between "God" and "Man" within the category "Nature" and are related to the same sense: i.e. "ability to die".

There are certain people that will suggest the contradiction isn't between the two natures (maybe they realize the two natures are not the same sense and different categories), but rather they suggest that the contradiction must be of the Person. The person himself, the Second Person in the Trinity, God the Son, the Word, who is God in the flesh, doesn't have any directional opposites of himself. As If the Son is a person, then the selfsame Son cannot be a person. Person, non-Person (P, ~P). The Son is the selfsame identical person being that underlying existence of both natures. The Son-person is not identical and opposites of the Father-person or the Holy Spirit-person too.

And there isn't any directional opposite properties too, such as: "Omniscient and Non-omniscient, Omnipresent and Non-omnipresent, Omnipotent and Non-omnipotent" being possessed by the Person. The framework has "properties are of the nature and not of the person. Basically the both natures' properties maintain its condition, and kept as it is or remained as it is, without decay, damage, destroy, and change i.e. protected/preserved. For instance, the human properties doesn't leave the human nature and place itself inside the Person or inside the Divine Nature. While the human nature no longer have the human properties. The human properties never left the human nature. Also, conversely, the same goes according to the Divine Nature too. Obviously according to the doctrine, we can say, "It is not the case that powerless is a property of the Divine Nature." So powerless does not belong to the Divine Nature. In the same manner that tails does not belong to the same side-of-heads. Its not one and the same thing, they don't belong to each other.

The analysis asserts (without any support) that all actions taken by the person that are contradictory to one nature are exclusively attributed to the other nature. The question becomes: Are there actions that can be taken by the person that involve both natures but contradicts one of the natures?

I see. You are boiling everything down to the "action" of the Person. Actually its what the nature does, the action of the Natures, and the Person is simply the subject of predication. The Son-person is existing in two distinct ways simultaneously. The "distinction" is key to understanding how this occurs "at the same time" or simultaneous, but never revealed "in the same sense". The Person is that underlying existence of both Natures. And the two Natures are distinct in the union. That means his "existence" is in distinction to the distinctive Natures. And the framework has: "The divine properties accomplishes what belongs to the Divine Nature. The flesh properties accomplishes what belongs to the Human Nature. And the Person is the subject of predication". But both natures are two different categories and not the same sense. And the communication of properties is understood in the Chalcedonian Creed phrase "concurring in" con- 'together with' + currere 'to run,' which this is a two operational functionality. And that functionality is distinctive and simultaneous. Or both Divine's properties and Human's properties are not communicated to each other, as if the properties parted and divided between the two natures nor the properties parted and divided between two personalities.

I don't know if you have followed this discussion several months ago. Its like 20 pages long, but very informative to say the least.


For example: The person Jesus died. By definition he was mortal and not immortal. The immortality of one nature and mortality of the other nature are in direct contradiction. The attribute "ability to die" has a "yes" and "no" result in the same sense at the same time. To say that Jesus didn't die on the cross entails enormous theological ramifications.

Cyril, the one who coin the phrase, "Hypostatic Union" has addressed this was back in ancient times before the Chalcedonian Creed was established. I can give you some quotes if you want or if you want to discuss it out we can do that too. But these types of arguments usually depends on the person's view point, for instance:

1. What is your definition of death? If you mean it in the sense that "soul separated from the body," then it would follow into...

2. Is the human soul mortal or immortal? If the human soul is immortal, then I don't see how you can explain any type of logical contradiction.​

From my standpoint, death is simply a matter of the soul separating from the body. Then the immortal soul can no longer give life or existence to that body. A person would simply breathe their last breath and the body will stop functioning and shut down altogether. The same operation of the soul to the body happened in Jesus Christ. There is no difference because he has become one of us. Jesus breathed his last breath on the cross. That life or existence is cut-off from his body, but that life or existence is not cut-off from the soul. His soul and body separated, "He was put to death in the body" (1 Peter 3:18) and "he might taste death for everyone" (Hebrews 2:9), again, death simply means "the body without the spirit is dead" (James 2:26). Therefore, the Son-Person died in the body only in the sense that his life was withdrawn from the body, but he continued existing in the immortal soul as both God and Man.

"... we say that the Word of God hath suffered in the Flesh for our sakes, we hold HIM even thus Impassible as God, at least allow to thine own words that they appear to have been rightly framed. For just as he who said man, indicated the soul together with the body although it be of another nature than it; and even though such an one's body were said to be dead, the whole person would reasonably be held to have suffered this, albeit he possess a soul which is not recipient of death: SO OF CHRIST TOO the Saviour of us all. ..." (Cyril of Alexandria, Five Tomes Against Nestorius).​

Again, the Son-Person had literally "tasted" (Hebrews 2:9) or experienced and suffer death. This suffering is only in the sense that his immortal life was being withdrawn from the body but not withdrawn from the soul. The body was his own and personal to the Son-Person (LORD of Glory) - the sufferings of the body and death is being ascribed (1 Corinthians 2:8). Unitarians would argued against Trinitarians and Oneness, alike, that the Son-Person died (even the soul died too according to them) as being unconsciousness and cease existing for three whole days. The question "Did God die?" really boils down to what is your definition and meaning of death. I am incline to go with the Son-Person died in the flesh in the sense that life was withdrawn from the body and suffered. Since the Son-Person didn't literally died per se in the sense of annihilation, but suffered that disconnection of his immortal life from his body, basically death in the Biblical sense. While the Son-Person continued existing in the immortal soul and also remaining being God and man even in those three days of bodily death.
 
What is the ontological opposite of God?
[Category of God

Omnipotent​
Omnipresent​
Omniscient​



Any thoughts, opinions, and challenges?

The answer to your question: "What is the ontological opposite of God?" is found in your assumption that God can be categorized. God is not subject to categorization. Another way to look at it is that God cannot be objectified. There is no referent for the term "God". We can only define the term which ultimately has nothing to do with the ontological reality which transcends categorization.

Omnipotence comes from omnia + potenz which means all potent, or all potential, which is the opposite of what is actual. What is actual is no longer potential. Ultimately, potential doesn't exist which agrees with those translations of God's name which affirm God's will to become rather than what God is. However, whatever will be is also somehow God due to the fact that if we go with that interpretation, then whatever he will be is who or what God is. If God will be whatever is, then whatever is, must necessarily be God. God is Creator and whatever God creates.

Obviously, this is a contradiction which leaves no other alternative other than to read it as whatever exists, exists because of God's will to actualize potential. God is not what is actualized, but the will which actualizes potential. The opposite would be to destroy what exists, or perhaps to negate existence itself. God is not existence or being, but the origin of existence or being (1 Corinthians 8:6). God is not the origin of nothing. By definition, nothing doesn't exist. Nothing cannot be an act of creation. God cannot create nothing.

Omniscience refers to the faculty of knowing itself. All knowing does not allow for the known or even the Knower. Omniscience cannot be known. This fits with transcending categorization as well.

On some level, omnipresence is a homeomorphic equivalent to omniscience. In other words, a different frame of mind see's God's omniscience being equivalent to omnipresence. One could also see it as due to his omnipresence. Omnipresence doesn't allow for the absence of God's presence, but the presence of God's absence. Again, this cannot be objectified.

From this I would conclude that one aspect that stands in stark contrast to the ontological reality of God is idolatry. Whatever one can imagine cannot be God. God cannot be objectively worshipped. Worship can only take place in Spirit and Truth, therefore the opposite is falsehood, lies, confusion and the profane.
 
Thanks for the thoughtful reply. But Its hard to understand what you are saying here because you are not speaking in the Hypostatic Union/Chalcedonian language. I would assume when you say, "Nature" then you are referring to "subsistence/hypostasis" or in other words, "Son-person". In one sense both Divine and Human Natures are separate categories. But since we are talking about a "union" (Hypostatic Union, then in the other sense both Divine and Human Natures are distinct categories. Or, a joining two natures together in the Son-person. And "God" and "Man" are not properties and attributes of the Natures or of the Person. Rather its what the natures have constituted what the Son-person to be, like: the Divine Nature constitutes the Son-person to be God and the Human Nature consitutes the selfsame Son-person to be Man. So Jesus Christ is both God and Man, the Person who continued remaining what he was fully God, while also simultaneously became what he previously has not been before fully Man. And he continues to be both God and Man at the same time forever.

I am using nature as the standard trinitarian of the hypostatic union uses it. For example: The Hypostatic Union is the union of the two natures (Divine and human) in the person of Jesus. (https://carm.org/dictionary/hypostatic-union/).

I am not attached to any particular definition of the word nature for the sake of this discussion but am of the belief that the sense of the word "nature" is intended to be consistent between the phrases "human nature" and "divine nature". However, if you wish that the sense of the word "nature" has one sense in "human nature" and another sense in "divine nature", then please provide the word-sense disambiguation.

As it stands, you've claimed that "human nature" and "divine nature" are in different categories without identifying any rationale for making the claim. It is as if you have said that the color red and the color green (divine nature and human nature) are in different categories and left it to the imagination as to why. The colors are different colors and likewise the natures are different natures, but what is it about these differences constitute a "category" difference, and how do the reasons for this category difference mean anything to the discussion?

There are certain people that will suggest the contradiction isn't between the two natures (maybe they realize the two natures are not the same sense and different categories), but rather they suggest that the contradiction must be of the Person. The person himself, the Second Person in the Trinity, God the Son, the Word, who is God in the flesh, doesn't have any directional opposites of himself. As If the Son is a person, then the selfsame Son cannot be a person. Person, non-Person (P, ~P). The Son is the selfsame identical person being that underlying existence of both natures. The Son-person is not identical and opposites of the Father-person or the Holy Spirit-person too.

And there isn't any directional opposite properties too, such as: "Omniscient and Non-omniscient, Omnipresent and Non-omnipresent, Omnipotent and Non-omnipotent" being possessed by the Person. The framework has "properties are of the nature and not of the person. Basically the both natures' properties maintain its condition, and kept as it is or remained as it is, without decay, damage, destroy, and change i.e. protected/preserved. For instance, the human properties doesn't leave the human nature and place itself inside the Person or inside the Divine Nature. While the human nature no longer have the human properties. The human properties never left the human nature. Also, conversely, the same goes according to the Divine Nature too. Obviously according to the doctrine, we can say, "It is not the case that powerless is a property of the Divine Nature." So powerless does not belong to the Divine Nature. In the same manner that tails does not belong to the same side-of-heads. Its not one and the same thing, they don't belong to each other.

Setting aside most of this, think about the core sentence of your logic:

"the human properties doesn't leave the human nature and place itself inside the Person".

According to this doctrinal claim
  • Jesus does not and never had any divine properties
  • Jesus does not and never had any human properties
  • His Father does not and never had any divine properties
  • You have never had any human properties.
This would be a hard sell in any Judeo-Christian theological discussion.

I see. You are boiling everything down to the "action" of the Person. Actually its what the nature does, the action of the Natures, and the Person is simply the subject of predication. The Son-person is existing in two distinct ways simultaneously. The "distinction" is key to understanding how this occurs "at the same time" or simultaneous, but never revealed "in the same sense". The Person is that underlying existence of both Natures. And the two Natures are distinct in the union. That means his "existence" is in distinction to the distinctive Natures. And the framework has: "The divine properties accomplishes what belongs to the Divine Nature. The flesh properties accomplishes what belongs to the Human Nature. And the Person is the subject of predication". But both natures are two different categories and not the same sense. And the communication of properties is understood in the Chalcedonian Creed phrase "concurring in" con- 'together with' + currere 'to run,' which this is a two operational functionality. And that functionality is distinctive and simultaneous. Or both Divine's properties and Human's properties are not communicated to each other, as if the properties parted and divided between the two natures nor the properties parted and divided between two personalities.

I don't know if you have followed this discussion several months ago. Its like 20 pages long, but very informative to say the least.


I didn't boil "everything down to "action", what I did do was describe a means by which your hypothesis can be tested. The idea that natures do the acting and not persons is far-fetched in light of biblical exposition of the judgment seat. As the bible makes clear, it is the actions a person does that determine whether the person is accepted or rejected.

Cyril, the one who coin the phrase, "Hypostatic Union" has addressed this was back in ancient times before the Chalcedonian Creed was established. I can give you some quotes if you want or if you want to discuss it out we can do that too. But these types of arguments usually depends on the person's view point, for instance:

It doesn't matter what the definition of death is as it relates to the discussion. Whatever definition of death that you wish to apply in the discussion is acceptable as long as you affirm that the Jesus died (as is his testimony and the testimony of almost every book of the new Testament). Things that didn't die, like his shoes, robe, staff, and whatever else die aren't relevant to the discussion.

If Cyril believed that Jesus didn't die, anything he said should be ignored without hesitation. The death of Jesus Christ is central to the gospel.
 
The answer to your question: "What is the ontological opposite of God?" is found in your assumption that God can be categorized. God is not subject to categorization. Another way to look at it is that God cannot be objectified. There is no referent for the term "God". We can only define the term which ultimately has nothing to do with the ontological reality which transcends categorization.

From this I would conclude that one aspect that stands in stark contrast to the ontological reality of God is idolatry. Whatever one can imagine cannot be God. God cannot be objectively worshipped. Worship can only take place in Spirit and Truth, therefore the opposite is falsehood, lies, confusion and the profane.

Yeah, sure, that's cool with me. I, on the other hand, as you already know, ontological "category" from the perspective of Predicate Logic and Categorical Syllogism. Basically, it describes "all" (universal/universal quantification) or 'some" (particular/existential quantification) of the members as belonging to a specific classification. In Predicate Logic the symbol ∃ is called the existential qualifier which is technically a backwards "E" (which means 'there exist' or 'there is' or 'for some' etc.). It's always used with a variable, such as x, with ∃x being translated into English as "There exist an x such that..." is equivalent to I-statement "Some S are P" in Category Syllogism. The word "some" is almost always taken to mean "at least one" of its kind and class, or commonly it often means "more than one of the specified thing or individual in existence," of its kind and class. But since we are specifically referring to one particular individual in the Bible, namely Jesus Christ/the Begotten Son (who is one and only, of its kind and class, unique), then it simply means "at least one" individual and no other of its kind and class. (John 1:14, 18, 3:16, 18, 1 John 4:9)

The I-statement in Categorical Syllogism:
Some G are M

may be expressed as
For some x, x is G and x is M
∃x [Gx ^ Mx]

Existential Generalization (EG): Gx ^ Mx |- ∃c [Gc ^ Mc]

Jesus Christ is both God and Man.
Therefore, there is at least one individual who is both God and Man.

Existential Instantiation (EI): ∃x [Gx ^ Mx] |- Gc ^ Mc

There is at least one individual who is both God and Man.
Therefore, Jesus Christ is both God and Man.

Obviously, this is a contradiction which leaves no other alternative other than to read it as whatever exists, exists because of God's will to actualize potential. God is not what is actualized, but the will which actualizes potential. The opposite would be to destroy what exists, or perhaps to negate existence itself. God is not existence or being, but the origin of existence or being (1 Corinthians 8:6). God is not the origin of nothing. By definition, nothing doesn't exist. Nothing cannot be an act of creation. God cannot create nothing.

Let's say that nothing is impossible with God. For example of the Omnipotent Paradox, "God can pop out of existence and not pop back into existence?" Maybe you believe God can perform such actions. Then he cannot perform all actions, yet, on the other hand, if God cannot limit its own actions, then that is something God cannot do. The Scriptural context in Matthew 19:26 has God performing the "possible" from his omnipotence. Which implies that the possible is restricted only in respect of salvation. But Scripturally there is an over all broad extensive application of God's omnipotence that is restricted to his nature where the property of omnipotence is derived.

If Christ could limit his omnipotent, then its according to the Divine Nature. Christ cannot limit his omnipotent according to his human nature since the human nature itself doesn't have the property of omnipotence. The Omnipotent Paradox can only be in reference according to one of Christ's nature and not between both natures. After all Christ has two natures that are two difference senses and not the same sense.

⦁ Now what is being ascribed or attributed to the subject Jesus Christ, which is both properties of "omnipotent and powerless." In other words, Jesus Christ as God is omnipotent according to the Divine Nature. And as a Man, he is powerless according to the human nature. Which the antithesis would have to result into neither true nor false. Jesus Christ is God in the flesh, and as God he said: "With man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible." (Matthew 19:26 i.e. Mark 10:27, Luke 18:27).

Categorical Syllogism: All S are P
"All things are possible."

⦁ We perceive God performing the impossible from the standpoint of us being human beings since we are not omnipotent. But from God's standpoint he performs what is only possible in context of his essential nature or the Divine Nature. And within the scope of a quantifier God is free to perform all though things that are possible from his omnipotent only within the scope or within the means that "He cannot go against his own nature" i.e. or all things that are possible in accordance to his nature. In 2 Timothy 2:13 "if we are faithless, he remains faithful, for he cannot disown himself." God is omnipotent and nothing is impossible, not in the sense of unlimited capacity, but only in the extended range and scope of his essential nature. He cannot disown himself of who he is essentially. Even if God became powerless, he still remain all powerful.

Predicate Logic: ∀x∀ (Sx ---> Px)
All things are possible."
 
(...) God is not subject to categorization. Another way to look at it is that God cannot be objectified. There is no referent for the term "God". We can only define the term which ultimately has nothing to do with the ontological reality which transcends categorization.
(...)
From this I would conclude that one aspect that stands in stark contrast to the ontological reality of God is idolatry. Whatever one can imagine cannot be God. God cannot be objectively worshipped. Worship can only take place in Spirit and Truth, therefore the opposite is falsehood, lies, confusion and the profane.
Interesting ...

We have a good example of that in the OT:

Exo. 32:1 Meanwhile the people got to see that Moses was taking a long time about coming down from the mountain. So the people congregated themselves about Aaron and said to him: “Get up, make for us a god who will go ahead of us, because as regards this Moses, the man who led us up out of the land of Egypt, we certainly do not know what has happened to him.” 2 At this Aaron said to them: “Tear off the gold earrings that are in the ears of YOUR wives, of YOUR sons and of YOUR daughters and bring them to me.” 3 And all the people began tearing off the gold earrings that were in their ears and bringing them to Aaron. 4 Then he took [the gold] from their hands, and he formed it with a graving tool and proceeded to make it into a molten statue of a calf. And they began to say: “This is your God, O Israel, who led you up out of the land of Egypt.”
5 When Aaron got to see this, he went to building an altar before it. Finally Aaron called out and said: “There is a festival to Jehovah tomorrow.” 6 So on the next day they were early in rising, and they began offering up burnt offerings and presenting communion sacrifices. After that the people sat down to eat and drink. Then they got up to have a good time.
7 Jehovah now said to Moses: “Go, descend, because your people whom you led up out of the land of Egypt have acted ruinously. 8 They have turned aside in a hurry from the way I have commanded them to go. They have made a molten statue of a calf for themselves and keep bowing down to it and sacrificing to it and saying, ‘This is your God, O Israel, who led you up out of the land of Egypt.’” 9 And Jehovah went on to say to Moses: “I have looked at this people and here it is a stiff-necked people. 10 So now let me be, that my anger may blaze against them and I may exterminate them, and let me make you into a great nation.”

Christendom has done the same thing for centuries: they worship Jesus, the Lamb of God, as if it were "a festival to Jehovah."
 
Yeah, sure, that's cool with me.
Great.
I, on the other hand, as you already know, ontological "category" from the perspective of Predicate Logic and Categorical Syllogism.
Please construct a complete sentence.
Jesus Christ/the Begotten Son (who is one and only, of its kind and class, unique), then it simply means "at least one" individual and no other of its kind and class. (John 1:14, 18, 3:16, 18, 1 John 4:9)
With regards to what I already posted, this classification cannot extend to God, but only extends from God.
Let's say that nothing is impossible with God. For example of the Omnipotent Paradox, "God can pop out of existence and not pop back into existence?"
Let's say that nothing is meaningfully impossible instead. God is not the author of confusion.
the human nature itself doesn't have the property of omnipotence.
Agreed.
The Omnipotent Paradox can only be in reference according to one of Christ's nature and not between both natures. After all Christ has two natures that are two difference senses and not the same sense.
Perhaps, not sure that I really care to begin with. I was just addressing the OP.
⦁ Now what is being ascribed or attributed to the subject Jesus Christ, which is both properties of "omnipotent and powerless." In other words, Jesus Christ as God is omnipotent according to the Divine Nature.
This is basically just Begging the Question. Jesus objectively existed, but self sacrifice or self denial objectively obliterates him, e.g. "the flesh counts for nothing".
And as a Man, he is powerless according to the human nature.
It is only through that man that God's power is manifest or personified.
Which the antithesis would have to result into neither true nor false. Jesus Christ is God in the flesh, and as God he said:
Not according to Paul who usefully observed that he was "the image of the invisible god". The word Paul uses in the Greek for our translation of "image" is the word "eikon" or as we know it "icon".

Contrary to popular opinion, there is a distinct difference between icons and idols. An icon is a representation whereas an idol is worshipped as god. By definition, representations or representatives are not what or who they represent.
God is free to perform all though things that are possible from his omnipotent only within the scope or within the means that "He cannot go against his own nature"
Which necessarily precludes him from doing anything, hence the need for a son "through whom" all is accomplished (1 Corinthians 8:6)

See my first post for more on why this must be the case. If you're so inclined, feel free to address any of the arguments I presented in that post as well.
 
I am using nature as the standard trinitarian of the hypostatic union uses it. For example: The Hypostatic Union is the union of the two natures (Divine and human) in the person of Jesus. (https://carm.org/dictionary/hypostatic-union/).

I have found some time to respond. Thanks for your patience.

This is how CARM understand nature in light of both Divine and Human Natures.

Here is CARM's reference:
In philosophy, it can refer to the essence of something. Likewise, theologically, the nature of something is that which makes something what it is. It is the most basic essence of something. ... as it relates to Christ and the incarnation, Jesus has two natures. That is, He has a divine essence and also a human essence in the one person. The essence of something is revealed by the characteristics it produces.​

The Catholic Encyclopedia says:
Etymologically (Latin natura from nasci, to be born, like the corresponding Greek physis from phyein, to bring forth) ... "Nature properly speaking is the essence (or substance) of things which have in themselves as such a principle of activity (Aristotle, "Metaphysics", 1015a, 13).​

I am not attached to any particular definition of the word nature for the sake of this discussion but am of the belief that the sense of the word "nature" is intended to be consistent between the phrases "human nature" and "divine nature". However, if you wish that the sense of the word "nature" has one sense in "human nature" and another sense in "divine nature", then please provide the word-sense disambiguation.

Who can really definite the Divine Nature? We cannot place God underneath a microscope for experimental and observational studies. Its a lack of definition when it comes to the Divine Nature. The Bible can tell us certain essential properties like Divine, Spiritual, and Invisible, etc. So from my standpoint, the standard definition for nature is essence or substance, which would be the "thing-in-itself". Unless a person wishes to distinguish the essential properties from its own substance that it inheres.

In other words, nature simply is essence, like the essential property of redness in a apple, redness inhere (exist essentially or permanently in) the apple. And that would have the same conceptual definition being applied to both the Divine Nature and the Human Nature too. The only thing different is that each nature has their own different kind of properties and attributes. The Divine Nature is uncreated substance and essentially spiritual, and also, the Human Nature is created and essentially physical. The natures would be different in that sense, so we categorize them when logically speaking about God and Man.

As it stands, you've claimed that "human nature" and "divine nature" are in different categories without identifying any rationale for making the claim. It is as if you have said that the color red and the color green (divine nature and human nature) are in different categories and left it to the imagination as to why. The colors are different colors and likewise the natures are different natures, but what is it about these differences constitute a "category" difference, and how do the reasons for this category difference mean anything to the discussion?

I believe that I did in the OP. And I've based that on different properties and attributes:

Category of God
Omnipotent
Omnipresent
Omniscient

Category of Man
powerless
Localized
Ignorant

Filling in the definition of nature would have been common sense and common knowledge at that point. You can obviously see the difference, "God is omnipotent and Man is powerless". I've also even further elaborated that properties belong to the nature and not of the person. Unless you want to believe that the property of redness is not a property of the apple's nature.

The Hypostatic Union framework has "properties are of the nature and not of the person. Basically the both natures' properties maintain its condition, and kept as it is or remained as it is, without decay, damage, destroy, and change i.e. protected/preserved. For instance, the human properties doesn't leave the human nature and place itself inside the Person or inside the Divine Nature. While the human nature no longer have the human properties. The human properties never left the human nature. Also, conversely, the same goes according to the Divine Nature too. Obviously according to the doctrine, we can say, "It is not the case that powerless is a property of the Divine Nature." So powerless does not belong to the Divine Nature. In the same manner that tails does not belong to the same side-of-heads. Its not one and the same thing, they don't belong to each other.​

Setting aside most of this, think about the core sentence of your logic:

"the human properties doesn't leave the human nature and place itself inside the Person".

According to this doctrinal claim
Jesus does not and never had any divine properties
Jesus does not and never had any human properties
His Father does not and never had any divine properties
You have never had any human properties.
This would be a hard sell in any Judeo-Christian theological discussion.

Semantics? Christologically speaking, we define "nature" and "person" differently.

a). Nature or substance.
b). Person or subsistence.

Although, a person is not an essential property of a nature. Like how spiritual is an essential property of the Divine Nature and physical is an essential property of the Human Nature. But a person is essential to the nature, its just not a property of a nature. Some theology books would go as far to suggest that a person is essence or the persons are the tri-essence of God, but at the same time, distingusihing person from nature. Here is my definition for person.

Subsistence is Latin or substo, sub means "under" and sto means "to stand," while the same word has the same meaning in the Greek is a hypostasis, from huper which means "under" and histayme which means "to stand". In other words, both subsistence and hypostasis would be the underpinning, underlying, or foundation. And this gives the notion of "that which subsists in and by another or subsistence". Its the reality that lies underneath a substance that gives its existence. Therefore, a subsistence "is the real underlying reality (or essential intrinic inherent fundamental basis) of factual existence".

I didn't boil "everything down to "action", what I did do was describe a means by which your hypothesis can be tested. The idea that natures do the acting and not persons is far-fetched in light of biblical exposition of the judgment seat. As the bible makes clear, it is the actions a person does that determine whether the person is accepted or rejected.

Or, could it be that we have different definitions for nature and person. And that we understand things differently. Let's say that God created a human nature in the womb of Mary that has no person (or underlying personal existence). That human nature is a "thing-in-itself," but since it doesn't have a person, then the nature is "that which does not exist-in-itself, but must have something beside itself in which to exist" in the second Adam. In comparison, God created the first Adam from the dust of the ground. He created a "human being" (or generically fleshly/soulish that is not individualized yet), because it doesn't have individual personal existence of its own. Although it was created with a personality of its own. Created with a will of its own. And created with a conscious of it own. Etc. Those are properties of the human nature. But it cannot function in these properties like other human beings does because it has no personal existence. This human being is basically just an inanimated nature, lifeless, for it doesn't have a person or no individual personal existence, until God breathe life so it can function in those properties since its has personal existence. Now Adam has been individualized and functioning in his consciousness and other properties.
 
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