Predicate Nominatives in the prologue where subject and complement are articular

Roger Thornhill

Well-known member
In John 1:4 we find η ζωή ην το φως, the life was the light.

This appears to falsify the claim/rule that one can not determine the subject if both terms are articular.

Notice the parallel to John 1:1c. In the previous clause a participant has been activated as ζωή. Then και binds the 2 clauses and disproves the claim above.

The "life" is the subject, just like the linguists say it would be. (Buth (‘And’ or ‘but’, so what?1991:13)
Conjunctive και indicates continuity with the context of the “same subject or participant.”

This sinks a nail it this rule's coffin.

And, if this is so ambiguous, how many bible versions make "light" the subject?

An added bonus is the obvious use of anaphora to identify the life in both clauses as the same.

John did this with ο λόγος in 1:1. It's also why θεός at 1:1c is not identified as τον θεον at 1:1b.

This is consistent with the grammars such as Smyth and CGCG.

@Gryllus Maior
@John Milton
@The Real John Milton
 
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Gryllus Maior

Active member
In John 1:4 we find η ζωή ην το φως, the life was the light.

This appears to falsify the claim/rule that one can not determine the subject if both terms are articular.

Notice the parallel to John 1:1c. In the previous clause a participant has been activated as ζωή. Then και binds the 2 clauses and disproves the claim above.

The "life" is the subject, just like the linguists say it would be. (Buth (‘And’ or ‘but’, so what?1991:13)
Conjunctive και indicates continuity with the context of the “same subject or participant.”

This sinks a nail it this rule's coffin.

And, if this is so ambiguous, how many bible versions make "light" the subject?

An added bonus is the obvious use of anaphora to identify the life in both clauses as the same.

John did this with ο λόγος in 1:1. It's also why θεός at 1:1c is not identified as τον θεον at 1:1b.

This is consistent with the grammars such as Smyth and CGCG.

@Gryllus Maior
@John Milton
@The Real John Milton
No it doesn't. It simply means that they are completely convertible propositions.
 

Roger Thornhill

Well-known member
No it doesn't. It simply means that they are completely convertible propositions.

That explanation does not work for your Smyth quote, "the acropolis is still called ‘city’ by the Athenians."

The Acropolis is convertible with 'city.'

And, even a completely convertible propositions has a subject.

So you agree that J 1:1c would be a convertible proposition if θεός was definite like the Acropolis and 'city'?
 
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The Real John Milton

Well-known member
That explanation does not work for your Smyth quote, "the acropolis is still called ‘city’ by the Athenians."

The Acropolis is convertible with 'city.'

And, even a completely convertible propositions has a subject.

So you agree that J 1:1c would be a convertible proposition if θεός was definite like the Acropolis and 'city'?
You caught him in his own inconsistency.
 

Roger Thornhill

Well-known member
You caught him in his own inconsistency.

It'a not a good example to use to prove his point, that is for sure.

It appears he wants the Smyth entry to make a distinction between an arthrous θεός at 1:1c and a definite one without the article as if the latter is not a convertible proposition.

It's a way to have ones cake and eat it too.

He wanted to make the "distinguish" at Smyth to be between convertible proposition and not, but Wallace and all other exegetes use "distinguish" to be to distinguish between the S and PN.
 
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The Real John Milton

Well-known member
No it doesn't. It simply means that they are completely convertible propositions.

Gryllus, it is true that η ζωή and το φως are interchangeable (as opposed to being a subset proposition) but you have to understand that if the anarthrous θεος at 1:1c is taken to be definite then it too becomes interchangeable with ὁ Λόγος. Here is Daniel Wallace, GGBB p. 119,

Further, calling θεος in 1:1c definite is the same as saying that if it had followed the verb, it would have had the article. Thus it would be a convertible proposition with λόγος v (i.e., “the Word” = “God” and “God” = “the Word”). The problem with this argument is that the θεος in 1:1b is the Father. Thus to say that the θεος in 1:1c is the same person is to say that “the Word was the Father.” This, as the older grammarians and exegetes pointed out, is embryonic Sabellianism or modalism.

Why can't you grasp this ?
 

The Real John Milton

Well-known member
It'a not a good example to use to prove his point, that is for sure.

It appears he wants the Smyth entry to make a distinction between an arthrous θεός at 1:1c and a definite one without the article as if the latter is not a convertible proposition.

It's a way to have ones cake and eat it too.

He wanted to make the "distinguish" at Smyth to be between convertible proposition and not, but Wallace and all other exegetes use "distinguish" to be to distinguish between the S and PN.

Precisely!
 

Roger Thornhill

Well-known member
Precisely!

I found this from @Gryllus Maior before:

Repeating this just because I can (since I finally got the Kindle edition of the grammar for just such emergencies). Yes, my theory fits quite well (and Smyth as well, who simply reports that PN's regularly omit the article in order to distinguish it from the subject). CGG here gives a discourse reason that is not necessarily in contradiction with the Smyth.

The reason Smyth picked this example is that the S and PN are interchange. 'City' and Acropolis are two names for the same thing.

But I don't believe @Gryllus Maior considers ο λόγος and θεός interchange.

So, the Smyth example only makes sense when S and PN are interchangeable.
 

The Real John Milton

Well-known member
I found this from @Gryllus Maior before:

Repeating this just because I can (since I finally got the Kindle edition of the grammar for just such emergencies). Yes, my theory fits quite well (and Smyth as well, who simply reports that PN's regularly omit the article in order to distinguish it from the subject). CGG here gives a discourse reason that is not necessarily in contradiction with the Smyth.

The reason Smyth picked this example is that the S and PN are interchange. 'City' and Acropolis are two names for the same thing.
Yes.

Also, the example Gryllus picked from Smyth is not a S-PN construction. So it is not relevant to John 1:1c. In Greek a S-PN construction behaves differently in certain respects than a non- S-PN construction like the one Smyth gives. Smyth was talking about predicate nouns (NOT the same as a Predicate Nominative) in 1150. It is true that a Predicate Noun like the one in Smyth's sentence has no article, but it is NOT true that a Predicate Nominative has no article (sometimes it does , as in John 1:4, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων). I'm not sure if Gryllus keeps misrepresenting Smyth here out of sheer ignorance, or deliberately so. I hope it's because of the former reason.

1150. A predicate noun has no article, and is thus distinguished from the subject: καλεῖται ἡ ἀκρόπολις ἔτι ὑπʼ Ἀθηναίων πόλις the acropolis is still called ‘city’ by the Athenians T. 2. 15.

---

But I don't believe @Gryllus Maior considers ο λόγος and θεός interchange.

Let's see if he answers the question.


So, the Smyth example only makes sense when S and PN are interchangeable.

Yes, notice that the construction is with an action verb (καλεῖται , and not with a to be verb as is expected in S-PN constructions) and is just renaming the Subject. That is why in English translation we have to put "city" in inverted commas and it must be convertible with "The Acropolis." The same would be true in the original Greek.
 

The Real John Milton

Well-known member
I was reading through this thesis. Not surprisingly the author does not subscribe to the foolhardy claim that the "only reason for the lack of an article in a S-PN construction with an equative verb is to distinguish the S from the PN." Not only is this not the "only" reason, but it is NEVER the reason.

According to the thesis writer, the way to determine the S in a S-PN construction is to search for the more definite of the two. So for instance he says that (a) if one of the two is a proper name, it is the Subject. So if someone considers θεός in John 1:1c to be a proper name, they could potentially take it as the Subject even though it is anarthrous . (b) If both nouns are equally definite, then the one with the narrower reference is the S. (c) If only one noun is articular then it is the Subject (this is NOT the same as saying that the only reason the other noun lacks the article is to distinguish it from the Subject). In this regard, the author gives 1 John 4:8 as an example (where the anarthrous noun is NOT definite). (d) If one of the nouns has been referred to in the immediately preceding context, then it is the Subject. I find this reason , in agreement with Roger, to be the real one for ὁ λόγος being the Subject in clause c.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος.

Notice that ὁ Λόγος is the Subject in the immediately preceding context. This is hardly rocket science.
 

Gryllus Maior

Active member
I found this from @Gryllus Maior before:

Repeating this just because I can (since I finally got the Kindle edition of the grammar for just such emergencies). Yes, my theory fits quite well (and Smyth as well, who simply reports that PN's regularly omit the article in order to distinguish it from the subject). CGG here gives a discourse reason that is not necessarily in contradiction with the Smyth.

The reason Smyth picked this example is that the S and PN are interchange. 'City' and Acropolis are two names for the same thing.

But I don't believe @Gryllus Maior considers ο λόγος and θεός interchange.

So, the Smyth example only makes sense when S and PN are interchangeable.
I'm getting tired of people whose grammatical world consists of a few NT verses. In the context of John 1:1, θεός and λόγος are interchangeable.
 

Roger Thornhill

Well-known member
I'm getting tired of people whose grammatical world consists of a few NT verses. In the context of John 1:1, θεός and λόγος are interchangeable.


Really?

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with/facing himself?

Perhaps looking in a mirror?

If you can depersonalize θεός, JM can depersonalize λόγος.
 

Roger Thornhill

Well-known member
Really. Exactly the question John wants you to ask. Now you are starting to get it.

Can you show me an example from NT Greek where a bible writer clearly does this outside of a Trinitarian proof-text?

Or if not, broaden it a larger Greek corpus?

It really looks to me that this is an attempt to rationalize a patently illogical belief system.
 

The Real John Milton

Well-known member
Really?

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with/facing himself?

Perhaps looking in a mirror?

If you can depersonalize θεός, JM can depersonalize λόγος.

I'm not depersonalizing λόγος, I'm denying that it is a person to begin with. Also I'm not saying that θεός and λόγος are interchangeable. You were doing well until you stupidly attacked .
 

Roger Thornhill

Well-known member
I'm not depersonalizing λόγος, I'm denying that it is a person to begin with. Also I'm not saying that θεός and λόγος are interchangeable. You were doing well until you stupidly attacked .

It was hyperbole. But if λόγος were a person before the universe was created then would't it qualify as depersonalization if it was interpreted as being the Torah?
 
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