I have argued, in the past, against the conflation of the subjective perception of future objects of choice (options) into an indeterminate reality. In short, the conflation of a subjective perception into a metaphysical reality is what I have argued against. A compatibilist argues that the subjective perception of options is completely compatible with God's sovereignty over all things. The problem is with the indeterminist defining "option" in an indeterminist way and assuming that this is the only way of conceiving of "option," and then saying that the compatibilist denies choices and options. The compatibilist simply says that we make the choices that we do for causal reasons that are compatible with both the sovereignty of God and human responsibility; we hold to both. But the important point is that we don't define the terms in incompatibilist ways. (note that Jonathan Edwards, while defining the terms "choice," "options," etc continuously argues against the coherence of incompatibilist definitions; thus, when he makes his own view clear ("to choose is to prefer," or that a choice is in accord with one's highest preference, etc) he is simply expounding upon the basic nature of reality, namely, that we make choices on the basis of causal reasons.)
Lest the point be missed, when I point to "options," I'm pointing to subjective alternatives (i.e. options) present to the mind before the choice is made, I am arguing to the existence of a subjective reality of perception. And since there is only one person making a choice (law of identity), then only one choice is possible given that the totality of a person is only singular at each causal moment leading up to the choice. The only way to avoid this is to introduce either a violation of the law of identity, where a person is otherwise than himself at a causal moment, or at one point in the causal chain, a completely ontologically arbitrary cause comes about, which is no different than basing choice upon chance.
The counter-argument that God is ontologically arbitrary fails because God is eternal (unlike human beings), thus the comparison between God and man is a category error. The fact that God's nature is not based upon another is because He alone is eternal, and the appeal to preceding conditions or reality (Who made God?) is an irrational thought (contradiction) when considering an eternal being. Unlike God, man has a beginning and is finite. It makes sense to ask questions pertaining to man's finitude and ontological dependence. So yes, because God is eternal, there is no other that determines His existence in any way. Trying to apply God's ultimate eternal existence to finite, ontologically dependent man is again, nothing less that a robust category error. Am I saying that God's existence is equatable with chance? Of course not, and it's impossible to argue that eternal being is built off of chance. I am appealing to eternal ontological rationality, which is diametrically opposed to the finite, ontologically arbitrary view of human choice-making that I'm arguing against. Sure, if one wishes, they can say that God has no reason outside of Himself, and thusly His choices are arbitrary. All that this would achieve is to simply ignore the points that i have already made concerning God's eternal nature and the irrationality of the "who made God" question. Finite man is simply not an ultimate being like God is. God can say "I am that I am." Man cannot say this, and it is exactly this hubris that the Bible judges as sin, when man tries to think of himself in the "I am that I am" category.
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