The incoherency of libertarian free will

His clay

Well-known member
Not so great. That may be true of amoral (non-moral) choices, such as the choice between chocolate or vanilla ice cream; but it is not true of moral choices, such as the choice between whether to steal something or not. If my “desire” is to steal something, but my moral judgement tells me that would be the “wrong” thing to do, I am able to act contrary to my “desire,” and follow my conscience and do the “right” thing instead.
special pleading
 
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TomFL

Guest
I assure you that I am not one of them.

And exactly how does that qualification modify your definition of freewill? If for example somebody’s “innate or essential qualities or character” is to be a criminal, he has no other choice, freedom, or freewill to do otherwise than to be a criminal?
Is it difficult to see that one with an addiction might not be free to avoid that behavior
 
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TomFL

Guest
And since the person cannot be otherwise than what the person is at the moment of choice, then it follows that the ability to do otherwise is overthrown by your own definition + the law of identity. We have covered this before, but you don't like the ramifications, and it is clear that you still wish to propagate sheer nonsense.
No it is not assumed the LFW is absolute but limited


Libertarian freedom is the ability to genuinely choose between a range of options, each of which is consistent with one’s nature.

as was stated in the definition
 

His clay

Well-known member
desire does not make a choice the person does
Straw man critique. Saying that one's greatest desire is the cause of the choice is not at odds with saying that the person makes choices. It is just more specific; it states "what" of the person is the cause.
 

His clay

Well-known member
No it is not assumed the LFW is absolute but limited


Libertarian freedom is the ability to genuinely choose between a range of options, each of which is consistent with one’s nature.

as was stated in the definition
Hence, your definition means that only one object of choice is possible. Please try to follow the argument. You have jumped into compatibilistic freedom, but you are not willing to own the ramifications.
 
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TomFL

Guest
Hence, your definition means that only one object of choice is possible. Please try to follow the argument. You have jumped into compatibilistic freedom, but you are not willing to own the ramifications.
No it does not

You have just assumed that

And no I have not jumped into Calvinist compatibilism where ones desire are externally determined

You have shown no ramification that needed to be owned that have not already been stated
 

Reformedguy

Well-known member
No it does not

You have just assumed that

And no I have not jumped into Calvinist compatibilism where ones desire are externally determined

You have shown no ramification that needed to be owned that have not already been stated
Calvinism does not teach are desires are externally determined. Strawman. Our desires come from the heart
 

His clay

Well-known member
No it is not assumed the LFW is absolute but limited


Libertarian freedom is the ability to genuinely choose between a range of options, each of which is consistent with one’s nature.

as was stated in the definition
You have also conflated "multiple objects of choice" with "one's nature". There is just one human nature at the moment of choice. The person has only one mind. The person only has a definite set of desires. The person has only one evaluation at the moment of choice. In sum, the person with the full range of characteristics is one person (not a changing person) at the moment of choice. Hence, if the cause of the choice is the chooser, then it follows that the choice is only in keeping with the one sum total of that person at the moment of choice. Hence, the ability to do otherwise is destroyed, since there is only one chooser with a definite set of characteristics at the moment of choice.
 
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TomFL

Guest
Straw man critique. Saying that one's greatest desire is the cause of the choice is not at odds with saying that the person makes choices. It is just more specific; it states "what" of the person is the cause.
sorry no that is not a strawman

A strawman attributes to another a view which is not theres to knock it down

I simply noted the person determines his act when he makes a choice

desire does not chose the person does
 

Gary Mac

Well-known member
Libertarian free will is presented as having three qualities:

1. Not being determined.

2. Not being random or arbitrary.

3. Not simply a combination of the two, which would be called probabilistic.


The problem is these are the only conceivable way to describe events. It is literally nonsensical talk to claim an action is none of these things.

At this point free willers will often invoke "influence" as a way to imagine choices not being totally determined yet not random.
This is really an unintended obfuscation of reality. An influence must cause someone or it did nothing. It might cause you to consider or want a choice for example. But obviously if you don't make that choice then another stronger influence ended up causing the choice.
It is the net sum of those influences that cause choices. If they didn't, then by definition there would have to be a random component in the mix.
Everything in life is a choice choosing to do this or do that, be this or be that. Gods kingdom is a choice and either one chooses to live with Him in His same light or one chooses another belief system that is only beliefs about Him instead.
 

His clay

Well-known member
No it does not

You have just assumed that

And no I have not jumped into Calvinist compatibilism where ones desire are externally determined

You have shown no ramification that needed to be owned that have not already been stated
No, you have just assumed that. Your own definition leads you to that point. Yes, you have jumped into compatibilism, since you have ruled out the ability to do otherwise with your own definition. Libertarian freedom lies in ruins at your own hands. Sure, you are correct that you are resisting the "self" being determined by anything external, but that does not invalidate the point. You have endorsed a compatibilist view of human freedom and thusly excluded the ability to do otherwise.
 

His clay

Well-known member
sorry no that is not a strawman

A strawman attributes to another a view which is not theres to knock it down

I simply noted the person determines his act when he makes a choice

desire does not chose the person does
no one is saying that desire chooses, hence your straw man. Try to keep up please.
 
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Dizerner

Well-known member
I accept the Trinity because its parts are explicitly declared in Scripture. This is not true of libertarian freedom. Hence, the philosophical notion of libertarian freedom is not under the same umbrella. Further, scripture itself explicitly directly opposes the idea of libertarian freedom.

Fair enough. But the Trinity is deduced from Scripture not explicitly stated. I believe free will can also be conclusively deduced from Scripture.

Let's take a fairly mundane seeming passage and extrapolate some ideas from it.
3 But God came to Abimelech in a dream by night, and said to him, "Indeed you are a dead man because of the woman whom you have taken, for she is a man's wife."
4 But Abimelech had not come near her; and he said, "Lord, will You slay a righteous nation also?
5 "Did he not say to me,`She is my sister '? And she, even she herself said,`He is my brother.' In the integrity of my heart and innocence of my hands I have done this."
6 And God said to him in a dream, "Yes, I know that you did this in the integrity of your heart. For I also withheld you from sinning against Me; therefore I did not let you touch her.
7 "Now therefore, restore the man's wife; for he is a prophet, and he will pray for you and you shall live. But if you do not restore her, know that you shall surely die, you and all who are yours." (Gen 20:3-7 NKJ)

I believe just as the Trinity can be deduced from whatever passages you want to cite, so true autonomous decision can be from this passage (as well as hundreds of others, but this passage is sufficient and a good example).

This is a long setup but bear with me. At first God says to Abimelech that he is a dead man because he has sinned. Abimelech answers and implies that this is too harsh a judgment in the light of his current limitations of understanding the situation. Abimelech then declares he is innocent. In verse 6, God does not say Abimelech is wrong, but rather affirms that Abimelech is actually correct on this issue. He has done this "in the integrity" of his heart. Then God says he has somehow kept Abimelech from sinning so far as an act of mercy because of ignorance. But now Abimelech is no longer considered ignorant, as he has been warned, so we end with verse 7 in which God lays out two different outcomes that are both indicated to be a real possibility and determined by the choice Abimelech makes.

Honesty is an attribute of God, and honesty in communication is necessary if you want to be understood in the way you intend to say something. That is, in general, if you wish to convey information and not mislead someone, you actually have to mean what you say. We cannot claim Abimelech would understand this passage in any deterministic way, and if determinism were true it would not be beyond the capacity of God to phrase this in a deterministic way or even to explain that Abimelech actually has no choice in the matter and there are not two real, viable outcomes as God indicated, where Abimelech either "surely dies" or he will in fact "live" although he was declared dead already, which in this case would indicate he had a pending "death sentence," or ban, on him.

Now the truth about determinism is a sneaky one, because no matter how you phrase something to sound like autonomy you can always just claim it only sounds that way as some kind of illusion. But the default position of any text should not to be take it as an illusion, but to take it as meaning what it says, unless we have strong overriding context. With proponents of determinism, a small percentage of Bible verses that could be interpreted as deterministic are used as an overriding lens to reinterpret a much, much larger percentage of passages that are made to sound deliberately as if choice were two actual outcomes decided by the individual, instead of pre-decided by God. And this becomes so second nature, that, in my interaction with determinists anyway, they almost seem to think it's the natural way to interpret choices in Scripture as necessarily deterministic when that's actually not the default way to understand them.

So by using the exact same "hermeneutics" we would use to come to a deduction of the Trinity, we come to a consistent and predominantly used method in the Bible as describing choices as multiple potential outcomes determined by the agent.

If God wanted to convey a deterministic meaning of any kind to Abimelech it would have been easy, simple and clear to simply phrase what God says to Abimelech in a deterministic way, "I have chosen you to sin," or "You will go on and do what I have decided for you to do," or "you must fulfill your destiny and this is what it will be." God does not choose any of those easy options which would be honest and clear, to phrase something deliberately in a way that sounds non-deterministic, and this is not by any definition the honest way of communicating.

So although we have verses where Jesus says "the only true God" in reference to his Father, we take the higher percentage verses and reinterpret the lower percentage verses, to justify our interpretation that Jesus himself is the only true God as well. In the same way Scripture actually ends up directly supporting the idea of libertarian freedom, instead of "directly oppos[ing] the idea of libertarian freedom."

Blessings.
 
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