Jason Dulle Defends Kalam Against Hawking

1) We don't need an explanation of the explanation
Dulle argues that the "What caused God?" objection fails to invalidate Kalam because it wrongly assumes we need to know what caused X in order to say that X caused Y. He refers to William Lane Craig in support of this, pointing out that this is not how science works, and that it would lead to an infinite regress. He claims that the objection is a red herring.

This is a poor response because it is an obvious strawman. The objection is not that one must be able to explain anything put forward as an explanation, but rather that given something must remain unexplained, positing an unexplained God is no improvement over an unexplained universe. Contrary to Dulle, this directly addresses the faulty reasoning of Kalam and is not a red herring at all. It's as if Dulle thinks the objection is "What caused God? Nothing? Ha! Gotcha" rather than "What caused God? Nothing? Well, then the universe might be unexplained/uncaused too". The objection is not agreeing with Kalam's point about the universe needing a cause, and then criticizing theists for not being able to give a cause for God. It is rather pointing out that God being unexplained and uncaused undermines any reason we have for positing Him in the first place.
It's a red herring because God is not part of the argument. The argument is not a proof for the existence of God. I thought the quote by atheist, Luke Mulhauser (32:03) was sufficient to show that the ' then What caused God retort 'is not a proper rebuttal to the KCA.
2) It is a strawman to ask for the cause of an uncaused being
After strawmanning with his first point above, Dulle then suggests that it is a strawman to ask what caused God given that God is by definition uncaused and eternal. He says this is a bad question to ask, and we should instead ask theists to demonstrate rather than assume that God is uncaused.

This entirely misses the point of the objection. No-one says "Well, then what caused God?" in order to elicit a potential causal explanation. The whole point is to bring attention to the fact that the theist also accepts something uncaused and without explanation, and that this undermines their grounds for positing God in the first place.
The KCA is not a proof for the existence of God.
Dulle hypthetically replies that suppose God had a cause, how would that change the argument? It wouldn't. So then what would you say?
 
It's a red herring because God is not part of the argument. The argument is not a proof for the existence of God.
I agree that "What caused God?" isn't a direct objection to Kalam, but But Dulle is evaluating the objection in a context where he has already extended Kalam to argue for God as the creator of the universe. So it is not a red herring in this context. Dulle's stated reason for considering it to be a red herring is based on a failure to understand the point of the objection.

I thought the quote by atheist, Luke Mulhauser (32:03) was sufficient to show that the ' then What caused God retort 'is not a proper rebuttal to the KCA.
Mulhauser is right to say that we don't need to be able to explain X in order for X to explain Y, but this again entirely misses the point of the objection, as I explained. "What caused God?" is more of a rebuttal to the cosmological argument in general than to the KCA specifically, given that KCA doesn't mention God, as you rightly point out.

Dulle hypthetically replies that suppose God had a cause, how would that change the argument? It wouldn't. So then what would you say?
If God were amenable to being caused, then the "What caused God?" objection would lose its force. One would then have to press the objection more directly, by challenging the supporter of KCA to support its first premise or explain why the cause of the universe still needs to be God rather than something else. The "What caused God?" objection works precisely because God is meant to be an uncaused regress-stopper, which is what allows us to then ask why the universe itself could not fulfill the same role.
 
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3) There are good reasons why God cannot be caused
Following on from the above, Dulle argues that God cannot be caused because He is eternal, the greatest conceivable being, and is necessary rather than contingent. He points out that early theories of an eternal universe were also content to have the universe be uncaused.

Some of these points start to lean on arguments beyond Kalam (such as the ontological argument), but if Dulle is right about causation not being inherently temporal then it is not clear that being eternal excludes God from having a cause. And if existing at all times does exclude any possibility of a cause, then the same could hold for a universe with a beginning of time that would also have existed at all times.
How can something exist at all times and have a beginning? The universe would have to have existed prior to its beginning. Doesn't make sense.
But again, the main point Dulle is missing is that the objection is not that theists need to give a cause for God,

Isn't that what atheists ask, If the universe has to have a cause, then what caused God?
but rather that there is no good reason for allowing an uncaused God that cannot equally be seen as a good reason for allowing an uncaused universe.
I think that there is a good reason. God doesn't have a beginning. The universe has a beginning. If the universe isn't caused by something other than itself, then it came to exist from nothing.

If atheists don't like that theists say that God is eternal and uncaused, then why is it okay for atheists to assert the same and to say that the universe, which has a beginning, is uncaused?
4) The objection misunderstands the first premise
And here Dulle finally gets to the heart of the matter, pointing out that Kalam doesn't claim everything must have a cause, but only that everything with a beginning needs a cause. This is true, but it misses the point of the objection which is to challenge this very premise.

Having a beginning might open up the possibility of the universe having a cause, but it doesn't show that it must have a cause (and if time began with the Big Bang then a cause might still not be possible, as per Hawking's argument). Given that God would remain uncaused and without explanation, it is obvious that something must be uncaused and without explanation, so why not the universe? Kalam's assumption that only eternal things can lack causes/explanations remains arbitrary and unsupported.
To be eternal means there cannot be a beginning because it is always eternal. No beginning and no end.
Dulle says that something has to be eternal and uncaused, and that it could not be the universe given its finite beginning. But this doesn't really follow. All he is entitled to here is that something must have existed at all times and be uncaused, and this is just as true of a universe where time began at the Big Bang as it is of a universe with an eternal past.

A universe with an eternal past is not the same as a universe with a beginning. The timeline is different. One is uncaused and the other is caused or comes to exist from nothing.
 
How can something exist at all times and have a beginning?
By there being a first moment in the set of "all times".

Isn't that what atheists ask, If the universe has to have a cause, then what caused God?
Yes, but the question is generally rhetorical.

I think that there is a good reason. God doesn't have a beginning. The universe has a beginning. If the universe isn't caused by something other than itself, then it came to exist from nothing.
How is that a good reason? Why is not coming from anything only acceptable for eternal things?

If atheists don't like that theists say that God is eternal and uncaused, then why is it okay for atheists to assert the same and to say that the universe, which has a beginning, is uncaused?
It's not that we don't like God being posited as eternal and uncaused. It's that there's no good reason for positing God in the first place once you recognize that something must be uncaused.

To be eternal means there cannot be a beginning because it is always eternal. No beginning and no end.
Why does not having a beginning mean it can't be caused? Is it because there would be nowhere prior to the eternal thing where one could place the cause? Also, you are here telling me why an eternal thing cannot be caused, but you're not telling me why only eternal things could be uncaused.

A universe with an eternal past is not the same as a universe with a beginning. The timeline is different. One is uncaused and the other is caused or comes to exist from nothing.
An eternal universe and one with a beginning of time (i.e. with no prior time of any sort) differ in their timelines. Yet both will have existed at all times (infinite in one case, finite in the other), both are being postulated as uncaused, and neither will have come from anything (i.e. both will have 'come from nothing' in the relevant sense).
 
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