Why an atheist, naturalist should NOT trust their thoughts to be true.

Here's C.S. Lewis saying much the same thing:

"Supposing there was no intelligence behind the universe, no creative mind. In that case, nobody designed my brain for the purpose of thinking. It is merely that when the atoms inside my skull happen, for physical or chemical reasons, to arrange themselves in a certain way, this gives me, as a by-product, the sensation I call thought. But, if so, how can I trust my own thinking to be true? It's like upsetting a milk jug and hoping that the way it splashes itself will give you a map of London. But if I can't trust my own thinking, of course I can't trust the arguments leading to Atheism, and therefore have no reason to be an Atheist, or anything else. Unless I believe in God, I cannot believe in thought: so I can never use thought to disbelieve in God.”
 
Here's C.S. Lewis saying much the same thing:

"Supposing there was no intelligence behind the universe, no creative mind. In that case, nobody designed my brain for the purpose of thinking. It is merely that when the atoms inside my skull happen, for physical or chemical reasons, to arrange themselves in a certain way, this gives me, as a by-product, the sensation I call thought. But, if so, how can I trust my own thinking to be true? It's like upsetting a milk jug and hoping that the way it splashes itself will give you a map of London. But if I can't trust my own thinking, of course I can't trust the arguments leading to Atheism, and therefore have no reason to be an Atheist, or anything else. Unless I believe in God, I cannot believe in thought: so I can never use thought to disbelieve in God.”
Where did he write that?
I wonder where the original thought came from?
 
He doesn't explain why naturalism doesn't support, being able to trust our faculties.
Since our faculties consist of random atoms forming thoughts, we have a 50/50 chance of each thought being true or false.
The 'truth' of a belief is measured by it's predictive and explanatory power.
Who can measure that belief for us if we can't trust our own thoughts?
 
It comes down to this:

the naturalist "trusts" in a consistent universe
the theist trusts in a consistent god

and I see no reason to believe that the the latter is on any more secure footing than the former.
Since our faculties consist of random atoms forming thoughts, we have a 50/50 chance of each thought being true or false.
And what are the chances of a god's being consistent?
How would one even calculate that? (Not that the "50/50" mentioned here was calculated; it was merely asserted.)
 
Where would I find that?

I doubt it was filmed, since it was so many years ago, but I do recall seeing a reenactment on Dale Ahlquist's show a while back, but now (Bummer!) I can't find it, at least not on youtube.

Are you familiar with Chesterton? If not, I highly recommend Orthodoxy. I've read it several times; the first time it blew me away. It was as if every previous book I had ever read had been in black and white and this one was in glorious technicolor.
 
I doubt it was filmed, since it was so many years ago, but I do recall seeing a reenactment on Dale Ahlquist's show a while back, but now (Bummer!) I can't find it, at least not on youtube.

Are you familiar with Chesterton? If not, I highly recommend Orthodoxy. I've read it several times; the first time it blew me away. It was as if every previous book I had ever read had been in black and white and this one was in glorious technicolor.
I searched for it also. Then I read his thoughts on the book of Job. I found Orthodoxy on Amazon for kindle for 69 cents.
 
Since our faculties consist of random atoms forming thoughts, we have a 50/50 chance of each thought being true or false.

Who can measure that belief for us if we can't trust our own thoughts?
Wrong. Our faculties do not consist of random atoms forming thoughts.
 
It comes down to this:

the naturalist "trusts" in a consistent universe
the theist trusts in a consistent god

and I see no reason to believe that the the latter is on any more secure footing than the former.

And what are the chances of a god's being consistent?
How would one even calculate that? (Not that the "50/50" mentioned here was calculated; it was merely asserted.)
A consistent God explains a consistent universe.

Your the math guy. I took one statistics class in university and have completely forgotten it. His argument sounded reasonable to me.
 
A consistent God explains a consistent universe.
So does the non existence of any Gods that could interfere with the natural running of the universe.

An inconsistent natural universe wouldn't produce living creatures. We have a universe with living creatures, so now we are back to square one regarding the reason there is something rather than nothing.
 
So, how does Plantinga escape his own petard? Atheism could be true and so he can't trust his own thoughts. If not trusting thoughts is on the table as a possibility, then he could never know whether he can trust his thoughts or not.
This is less immediately decisive than it may seem, because it goes back to Plantinga's reasons for thinking Christianity is properly basic, which gets into the esoteric philosophizing of "Reformed epistemology."

 
This is less immediately decisive than it may seem, because it goes back to Plantinga's reasons for thinking Christianity is properly basic, which gets into the esoteric philosophizing of "Reformed epistemology."

I gave it a go, but gave up after many paragraphs and not seeing what you might mean. I might have missed or misunderstood it. Perhaps you could point me to the relevant part or summarise the point?
 
So, how does Plantinga escape his own petard? Atheism could be true and so he can't trust his own thoughts. If not trusting thoughts is on the table as a possibility, then he could never know whether he can trust his thoughts or not.

What petard? I'm sure he'd say that divine revelation has convinced him that atheism is NOT true, so therefore he CAN trust his own thoughts. And if your lame reply to that is "Yeah, but how can he trust his thoughts about having received divine revelation," remember that he's not the one thinking that thoughts are the result of materialistic predetermination. And surely any posited God would be capable convincing any recipient of his revelations that they are authentic, just by the divine quality of the revelations themselves.
 
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