Do Calvinists believe that middle knowledge exists at all?

Omniscience knows no possibilities.
God knew the possibility that Adam and Even would eat from the tree of life and live forever after having falling into sin, so He drove them out and posted cherubim and a flaming sword to prevent them from reentering. Why would He need to do this if He controls their every thought and action? And why would He speak of this as a possibility?
If it's possible what God foresees does not come about then what He foresees is untrue and He is not omniscient.
That's correct. But you're speaking not as if God knows all possible futures, but merely one settled future. Obviously if God foreknows one settled future, then what He foresees must necessarily come to pass. But that's begging the question: Is the future exhaustively settled? If not, then on what basis can we say that God knows it exhaustively?
 
Or more specifically; do Calvinists believe that true subjunctive conditionals (or true counterfactuals) exist and have actual truth value?

I just watched this video by James White in which he takes issue with the idea. The problem is that I've seen other videos of White in which he seems to say that he does believe in the existence of counterfactual information; so I'm not sure if he's just being inconsistent or if I've misunderstood him. But in this video he seems to argue (without explicitly saying so) that true counterfactuals simply cannot exist.

Notice how he argues based on the myriad of possible circumstances humans could have been placed in by God that it would be impossible to know how any of us would have acted if we had been placed in different circumstances. That seems to me to be, in principle, not far removed from an open theist position. An open theist would say that God cannot exhaustively know the future as settled because of things like free will and the nature of reality. White is saying that God cannot know anything other than what He has decreed. To White, the existence of true counterfactual information would imply that things exist independently of God. At least that's how I interpret his argument.

I have more thoughts on this but I'll wait and see what others say. I actually am not totally persuaded by Molinism (I think open theism is closer to the truth than Molinism), but I think White's attempts to rebut WLC's argument are quite problematic for his own views. How can anyone have a problem in principle with open theism if they themselves don't believe that God is capable of knowing something other than what He has decreed to happen?
Certainly the idea that God cannot know what he did not determine supports open theism in principle.

however I would reject both open theism and meticulous Devine determination of all things
 
God knew the possibility that Adam and Even would eat from the tree of life and live forever after having falling into sin, so He drove them out and posted cherubim and a flaming sword to prevent them from reentering. Why would He need to do this if He controls their every thought and action? And why would He speak of this as a possibility?

That's correct. But you're speaking not as if God knows all possible futures, but merely one settled future. Obviously if God foreknows one settled future, then what He foresees must necessarily come to pass. But that's begging the question: Is the future exhaustively settled? If not, then on what basis can we say that God knows it exhaustively?
Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions; yet hath he not decreed any thing because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions

Westminster Assembly, The Westminster Confession of Faith: Edinburgh Edition (Philadelphia: William S. Young, 1851), 26–27.
 
Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions; yet hath he not decreed any thing because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions

Westminster Assembly, The Westminster Confession of Faith: Edinburgh Edition (Philadelphia: William S. Young, 1851), 26–27.
Well that's interesting. Looks like some of the Calvinists here (if not most) are opposed to this clause in the Westminster Confession. Seems pretty significant to me.
 
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