1) "Chemical actions cannot cause mental events like weighing evidence"
2) "
If chemical actions
did produce mental events like weighing evidence,
then such weighing would be unreliable"
I asked you if you acknowledged that these were two different claims. You don't answer this explicitly, but since you say:
I believe the evidence points to both claims being most likely valid and true.
...it seems you are implicitly agreeing that they are two different claims (or else you wouldn't have said "both").
So, again, it is the second claim I am objecting to, as below.
Logic is a process that can produce conclusions and inferences. Logic is how our minds work, though due to our minds being abnormal and distorted away from logic, we often fail to use logic or fail to understand it well. Some of this can be remedied by education, but it will never return to our minds original normal state.
You had said that logic didn't "cause" things but did "produce" them. I said I didn't understand the distinction, and I still don't. What is the difference between saying "logic produces conclusions" and saying "logic causes conclusions"?
I think that when we say things like "logic tells us..." or "logic forces us to acknowledge..." we are just using figures of speech; there isn't really a logic angel which speaks to us or pushes us. Are you saying there is? If not, what is the process which you are alluding to? What is the beginning, middle and end of this process?
The next point is based on the following exchange we've had:
YOU:
Natural laws are what causes physical events. If naturalism is true then even those mental activities are just chemical reactions and so are those desires to know those "right" answers. How can chemical reactions know whether something is right or not? Chemical reactions cannot really know anything.
ME:
The naturalist claim is not that chemical reactions in the brain know things, but that chemical reactions in the brain cause mental states, and that mental states include knowing or wanting to know things. They say mental states are emergent properties, and that emergent properties have capacities (like judging truth and falsehood) which are not present in the causes they emerged from.
YOU [just now]:
Not if mental states are totally tied to the physical brain.
By "totally tied to" do you mean "entirely caused by"? Yes, that is the naturalist claim: that mental states and mental capacities are entirely caused by processes in the physical brain. So how does your "not if" work here? Naturalists claim that the brain is the cause of the thoughts and capacities, but they are
not making that claim,
if the brain is the cause of the thoughts and capacities? That obviously makes no sense.
If what you mean is, "yes, naturalists claim that these thoughts and capacities are caused by the brain, but that is not
true, if it is an absolute claim," then that is simply not an argument in favor of the claim of yours which I am addressing: that
if naturalism is true, then our judgments are unreliable. It is just an argument in favor of the claim that naturalism is not true. Again, these are two distinct claims.
If your argument is, "
If X is true, then Y follows," then you have to
let X be true, for the sake of the argument. If you're given an argument for why Y would
not follow, if X were true, you don't get to refute that by saying "but X isn't true!" And that's what you would be doing here, if your "not if" means "naturalist claims are not true."
If you mean something else by your "not if," can you please clarify what you do mean?
Not if mental states are totally tied to the physical brain. For example, if transgenderism is real, then that is evidence the mind is not very closely tied to the body and brain. Every cell in the body and brain is one gender, while the transgender person claims that their mind is the opposite gender. That shows very little influence of the body and brain on the mind regarding sex and gender.
This is not evidence against mental events being entirely caused by physical events in the brain. Nobody is saying that in a person with XY cells, neuron interactions have a male gender, and that in a person with XX cells they have a female gender. The interactions, even if caused by cells which carry chromosomes of one gender, do not themselves have a gender. Heartbeats in people with XY cells do not have a male gender, and immune responses in people with XX cells do not have a female gender.
And there are many other evidences that the mind and the brain are not tied closely. There are also NDEs.
Again, even if this is the case, it would be evidence that naturalism was false,
not evidence that
if naturalism were true, judgments would be unreliable. I am addressing the latter argument.
I acknowledge that naturalists make this claim but it is very problematic.
That doesn't matter at all for the purpose of argument here. Again, if your claim is, "
if naturalism is
true, then our conclusions are unreliable," you do not get to support that claim by saying "naturalist claims are likely to be false," or even "naturalist claims are demonstrably false." Again, an argument which starts with the premise that naturalism is true has to treat naturalism as if it
is true, for the sake of the argument. You're not disputing this, are you?
Because if naturalism is true then our conclusions would be based on the ratio of chemicals in your brain, not on the weighing of evidence.
You've said this repeatedly, and I've repeatedly replied: no, because the naturalist claim is that chemical activity
causes the mental state of considering evidence, so you can't just say that "the naturalist claim implies that the mental state of considering evidence does not exist or has no effect." You can't say that if a chain of causes leads to some effect, the last cause in the chain can be dismissed or ignored. Again:
Naturalist claim: chemical actions in the brain cause mental states and mental capacities.
Naturalist claim: among humans, mental states include the desire to know correct answers.
Naturalist claim: among humans, mental capacities include the ability to weigh evidence.
Naturalist claim: a capacity to weigh evidence well is an adaptive advantage.
Naturalist claim: natural selection will favor brains which provide adaptive advantages.
Naturalist conclusion: as a result of chemical actions in the brain, as honed by natural selection, human beings have a mental capacity to weigh evidence well.
For the purpose of your argument -- that "
if naturalism is
true, then our conclusions are unreliable" -- it simply does not matter at all if you can provide geometric proof that every one of the naturalist's claims is false. It
only matters if you can show that the naturalist account of how we have the ability to weigh evidence well is self-contradictory
. You aren't doing this.
See above.
See above about how no weighing of evidence could occur.
I see nothing above which addresses my objections.
The cause of thinking is your mind. . . . As Christians, we believe that the mind is made of spirit.
Does my mind have a cause?
Philosopher of the mind John Searle, says that 'Mental states are not the same as brain states."
I agree with Searle. (Though of course the fact that Searle said it, and that I believe it, does not settle it.) But it does not follow that brain states could not be the cause of mental states.